declaration that he was entitled to undivided half share in the suit property which was described in schedule to the plaint. Relying on two sale deeds effected by Defendant Nos.1 and 2 it was contended that the appellant was entitled to one half share in the suit property. It may be noted here that Defendant No.2, S. 3 Krishnamoorthy did not have a son but Defendant No.1, S. Venkateswaran had four sons. However, said four sons were not made parties in Original Suit No.64 of 1985 = The lower appellate court held that since four sons of Defendant No.1 were not parties to the suit for declaration and partition, insofar as branch of said Defendant No.1 was concerned the sale deed in favour of the appellant would be valid only in respect of share of said Defendant No.1. The lower appellate court held that the appellant would thus be entitled to the share of Defendant No.1 in his branch, namely 1/4 x 1/6 = 1/24 and the share of Defendant No.2. The 4 resultant share that the appellant was entitled to was, however, computed to be 5/24.= apex court held – However, there is a small error which needs to be corrected. The addition of 1/24 share of Defendant No.1 and 1/4th share of Defendant No.2 would aggregate to 7/24 and not 5/24. Except for this correction, the judgments under appeal do not call for any interference by this Court.

1 Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs.5534-5535 of 2007 A. Dharmalingam (Dead) by … Continue reading declaration that he was entitled to undivided half share in the suit property which was described in schedule to the plaint. Relying on two sale deeds effected by Defendant Nos.1 and 2 it was contended that the appellant was entitled to one half share in the suit property. It may be noted here that Defendant No.2, S. 3 Krishnamoorthy did not have a son but Defendant No.1, S. Venkateswaran had four sons. However, said four sons were not made parties in Original Suit No.64 of 1985 = The lower appellate court held that since four sons of Defendant No.1 were not parties to the suit for declaration and partition, insofar as branch of said Defendant No.1 was concerned the sale deed in favour of the appellant would be valid only in respect of share of said Defendant No.1. The lower appellate court held that the appellant would thus be entitled to the share of Defendant No.1 in his branch, namely 1/4 x 1/6 = 1/24 and the share of Defendant No.2. The 4 resultant share that the appellant was entitled to was, however, computed to be 5/24.= apex court held – However, there is a small error which needs to be corrected. The addition of 1/24 share of Defendant No.1 and 1/4th share of Defendant No.2 would aggregate to 7/24 and not 5/24. Except for this correction, the judgments under appeal do not call for any interference by this Court.

Section 50 of the NDPS Act. It is, therefore, mandatory for the prosecution to prove that the search and recovery was made from the appellant in the presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. 29. Though, the prosecution examined as many as five police officials (PW-1 to PW-5) of the raiding police party but none of them deposed that the search/recovery was made in presence of any Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer.- the prosecution was not able to prove that the search and recovery of the contraband (Charas) made from the appellant was in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Since the non-compliance of the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 50 of the NDPS Act is fatal 16 to the prosecution case and, in this case, we have found that the prosecution has failed to prove the compliance as required in law, the appellant is entitled to claim its benefit to seek his acquittal.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 273 OF 2007 Arif Khan @ … Continue reading Section 50 of the NDPS Act. It is, therefore, mandatory for the prosecution to prove that the search and recovery was made from the appellant in the presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. 29. Though, the prosecution examined as many as five police officials (PW-1 to PW-5) of the raiding police party but none of them deposed that the search/recovery was made in presence of any Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer.- the prosecution was not able to prove that the search and recovery of the contraband (Charas) made from the appellant was in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Since the non-compliance of the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 50 of the NDPS Act is fatal 16 to the prosecution case and, in this case, we have found that the prosecution has failed to prove the compliance as required in law, the appellant is entitled to claim its benefit to seek his acquittal.

Direct the appellant to treat the employees working in the Canteen to be the regular employees of the Chennai Port Trust and accordingly pay them all attendant and monetary 4 benefits at par with the regular employees of the Chennai Port Trust. = when the Management of the Port Trust has control over the functioning of the canteen- all the workers employed in the canteen are entitled for the relief what they claimed =If we see the Indian Petrochemical’s case, the similarity of the factual issues is quite startling. In that case – (a) The canteen has been there since the inception of the appellant’s factory. (b) The workmen have been employed for long years and despite a change of contractors, the workers have continued to be employed in the canteen. (c) The premises, furniture, fixture, fuel, electricity, utensils etc. have been provided for by the appellant. (d) The wages of the canteen workers have to be reimbursed by the appellant. (e) The supervision and control on the canteen is exercised by the appellant through its authorised officer, as can be seen from the various clauses of the 11 contract between the appellant and the contractor. (f) The contractor is nothing but an agent or a manager of the appellant, who works completely under the supervision, control and directions of the appellant. (g) The workmen have the protection of continuous employment in the establishment. On the basis of the above facts, the Supreme Court arrived at the opinion that the workmen were the workmen of the management and by the same process of reasoning, the learned single Judge also came to the conclusion that the canteen workmen were the workmen of the Port Trust.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.1381 OF 2010 Chennai Port Trust ….Appellant(s) … Continue reading Direct the appellant to treat the employees working in the Canteen to be the regular employees of the Chennai Port Trust and accordingly pay them all attendant and monetary 4 benefits at par with the regular employees of the Chennai Port Trust. = when the Management of the Port Trust has control over the functioning of the canteen- all the workers employed in the canteen are entitled for the relief what they claimed =If we see the Indian Petrochemical’s case, the similarity of the factual issues is quite startling. In that case – (a) The canteen has been there since the inception of the appellant’s factory. (b) The workmen have been employed for long years and despite a change of contractors, the workers have continued to be employed in the canteen. (c) The premises, furniture, fixture, fuel, electricity, utensils etc. have been provided for by the appellant. (d) The wages of the canteen workers have to be reimbursed by the appellant. (e) The supervision and control on the canteen is exercised by the appellant through its authorised officer, as can be seen from the various clauses of the 11 contract between the appellant and the contractor. (f) The contractor is nothing but an agent or a manager of the appellant, who works completely under the supervision, control and directions of the appellant. (g) The workmen have the protection of continuous employment in the establishment. On the basis of the above facts, the Supreme Court arrived at the opinion that the workmen were the workmen of the management and by the same process of reasoning, the learned single Judge also came to the conclusion that the canteen workmen were the workmen of the Port Trust.

Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Criminal Procedure Code= The law is clear, “prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent…. and there must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on the matter of substance and the Court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge”. The election petition itself has been dismissed and considering the entirety of the matter, it would not be expedient to initiate proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. read with Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C. We, therefore, accept the appeal and close the proceedings.

1 Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 649 OF 2018 (Arising out of … Continue reading Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Criminal Procedure Code= The law is clear, “prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent…. and there must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on the matter of substance and the Court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge”. The election petition itself has been dismissed and considering the entirety of the matter, it would not be expedient to initiate proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. read with Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C. We, therefore, accept the appeal and close the proceedings.

Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure,=The object of the rule is that courts should try the merits of the case that come before them and should, consequently, allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This Court, in a series of decisions has held that the power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceeding in the interest of justice. The main purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimise the litigation and the plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case.=The High Court was of the view that Proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as duly amended, laid down that once the trial had commenced, no amendment could be allowed unless the court were to come to the conclusion that the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial despite due diligence.= At the time when the application for amendment was preferred, only two official witnesses were examined. The nature of amendment as proposed neither changes the character and nature of the suit nor does it introduce any fresh ground. The High Court itself was conscious that the amendment would not change the nature of the suit. In the given circumstances, in our view, the amendment ought to have been allowed. In any case it could not have caused any prejudice to the defendants.

1 Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4568 OF 2018 (Arising out of … Continue reading Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure,=The object of the rule is that courts should try the merits of the case that come before them and should, consequently, allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This Court, in a series of decisions has held that the power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceeding in the interest of justice. The main purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimise the litigation and the plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case.=The High Court was of the view that Proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as duly amended, laid down that once the trial had commenced, no amendment could be allowed unless the court were to come to the conclusion that the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial despite due diligence.= At the time when the application for amendment was preferred, only two official witnesses were examined. The nature of amendment as proposed neither changes the character and nature of the suit nor does it introduce any fresh ground. The High Court itself was conscious that the amendment would not change the nature of the suit. In the given circumstances, in our view, the amendment ought to have been allowed. In any case it could not have caused any prejudice to the defendants.

“Whether in the light of peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, supporting manufacturer who receives export incentives in the form of duty draw back (DDB), Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB) etc. is entitled for deduction under Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961?” 16) Accordingly, we refer this batch of appeals to the larger Bench.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4590 OF 2018 (Arising out of Special … Continue reading “Whether in the light of peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, supporting manufacturer who receives export incentives in the form of duty draw back (DDB), Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB) etc. is entitled for deduction under Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961?” 16) Accordingly, we refer this batch of appeals to the larger Bench.

whether the respondent (plaintiff) was able to prove his subsisting title over the suit land on the date of filing of the suit and, if so, how, or in the alternative, whether the appellants (builder, firm and its partners) were able to prove the subsisting title of the original holders (three PATIL) over the suit land, if so, how.= The original holders (three PATIL) though filed the civil suits to get these issues adjudicated against the affected persons but failed in their attempt to get these issues adjudicated. In other words, by the time the original holders (three PATIL) approached the 31 Civil Court, their all rights in the suit land itself got extinguished on account of efflux of time (31 years) as has been held supra. In our view, therefore, the High Court was right in its reasoning and the conclusion in holding that the original holders (three PATIL) having lost all their rights, title and interest in the suit land on the expiry of 12 years from the date of re-grant in their favour (assuming the re-grant to be valid) in 1985 and secondly, they again lost their ownership rights due to dismissal of their two suits (O.S. Nos. 364 and 365 of 2004) on 23.11.2004, neither the original holders (three PATIL) and nor the appellants, who claimed through original holders, had any right to claim any interest in the suit land.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPERAL Nos. 4757-4760 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP … Continue reading whether the respondent (plaintiff) was able to prove his subsisting title over the suit land on the date of filing of the suit and, if so, how, or in the alternative, whether the appellants (builder, firm and its partners) were able to prove the subsisting title of the original holders (three PATIL) over the suit land, if so, how.= The original holders (three PATIL) though filed the civil suits to get these issues adjudicated against the affected persons but failed in their attempt to get these issues adjudicated. In other words, by the time the original holders (three PATIL) approached the 31 Civil Court, their all rights in the suit land itself got extinguished on account of efflux of time (31 years) as has been held supra. In our view, therefore, the High Court was right in its reasoning and the conclusion in holding that the original holders (three PATIL) having lost all their rights, title and interest in the suit land on the expiry of 12 years from the date of re-grant in their favour (assuming the re-grant to be valid) in 1985 and secondly, they again lost their ownership rights due to dismissal of their two suits (O.S. Nos. 364 and 365 of 2004) on 23.11.2004, neither the original holders (three PATIL) and nor the appellants, who claimed through original holders, had any right to claim any interest in the suit land.