When sec.15[2] of Hindu Succession Act not applies = The provisions of Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which has 5 been invoked by the High Court to reverse the decree in question, in our considered view, was not at all applicable inasmuch as Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 deals with the line of succession in case of property inherited by a female Hindu. In the present case, Muddamma had not inherited any property but what she had acquired is an absolute right to the suit property by way of the gift deed dated 9 th April, 1954. On her death, the property would, therefore, not vest in terms of Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 but would go to her husband who would be competent to transfer the same in favour of the present appellant.

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).8076-8077 OF 2018 [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE … Continue reading When sec.15[2] of Hindu Succession Act not applies = The provisions of Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which has 5 been invoked by the High Court to reverse the decree in question, in our considered view, was not at all applicable inasmuch as Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 deals with the line of succession in case of property inherited by a female Hindu. In the present case, Muddamma had not inherited any property but what she had acquired is an absolute right to the suit property by way of the gift deed dated 9 th April, 1954. On her death, the property would, therefore, not vest in terms of Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 but would go to her husband who would be competent to transfer the same in favour of the present appellant.

Section 302 IPC.= what is the difference between a related witness and an interested witness?�. The plea of “interested witness”, “related witness” has been succinctly explained by this Court that “related” is not equivalent to “interested”. The witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. In this case at hand PW 1 and 5 were not only related witness, but also �interested witness� as they had pecuniary interest in getting the accused petitioner punished. ; whether the Courts below exercised the judicial discretion in evaluating the evidence of PW1 and PW5 while convicting the accused. It may be noted that there is nothing on record to support the version of PWs 1 & 5 that on earlier occasions also and particularly on the date of incident, the accused quarreled with his grandmother demanding money and to settle the house in his favor. Further, it is on record that when the deceased was brought to the hospital, in the Accident Register, it was written as �history of fall�. According to the prosecution�s case, blood came out from the mouth and nose of the deceased, but there appears no seizure of bloodstained clothes of the deceased and chemical analysis. Thus, the inconsistent evidence by the alleged eyewitnesses as well as investigation agency would cause dent to the edifice on which the prosecution case is 14 built, and it adversely affects the substratum of the prosecution case. 20. We further find, to a certain extent, material infirmities, irregularities and contradictions in the prosecution case as also in the evidence of prosecution witnesses including the deposition of PWs 1 & 5, who are material witnesses. PW 1 in his cross examination categorically stated that his wife (PW 5) has filed a suit for partition against the accused and his family members whereas PW 5 in her cross examination denied the same. Likewise, there are contradictory statements of witnesses, primarily to the aspect of happening of incident, taking the victim to the hospital, the presence of PW1 at the time of alleged incident, detaining the accused from bus stand or from his mother-in-law�s house, recovery of material objects from the possession of accused and lodging of complaint by PW1 etc, and the whole story appears to be an utterly incredible one. More so, there was no explanation forthcoming from the prosecution side on the questions raised by the defense that soon after reaching the ABC hospital with victim, how can the PWs 1 & 5 directly approach Dr. Mohammed Ghouse Khan (PW8) 15 without going to Emergency Ward and why the Doctors at ABC hospital did not inform police when it was a medico legal case. Both the Courts below have simply noted that the variations and contradictory statements are not material in proving the guilt of the accused. We feel that the reasoning given by the Courts below is ex facie illegal. – we are of the view that there exists reasonable doubt in this case as the case of prosecution is un-supported by independent witnesses, ridden with contradictions, good motive for false prosecution and filled with suspicious circumstances. Further we are of the considered opinion that there is not only insufficiency of evidence but also lack of credibility on the trustworthiness of PWs 1 & 5 which culminated 16 into disproving the prosecution case and alleged guilt of the accused. The prosecution has, therefore, failed to establish the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt by adducing cogent evidence. We are satisfied that the Courts below completely misdirected themselves and the conviction imposed upon the accused by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error of law and perversity of approach and deserves to be set aside.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 381 OF 2018 ARISING OUT OF … Continue reading Section 302 IPC.= what is the difference between a related witness and an interested witness?�. The plea of “interested witness”, “related witness” has been succinctly explained by this Court that “related” is not equivalent to “interested”. The witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. In this case at hand PW 1 and 5 were not only related witness, but also �interested witness� as they had pecuniary interest in getting the accused petitioner punished. ; whether the Courts below exercised the judicial discretion in evaluating the evidence of PW1 and PW5 while convicting the accused. It may be noted that there is nothing on record to support the version of PWs 1 & 5 that on earlier occasions also and particularly on the date of incident, the accused quarreled with his grandmother demanding money and to settle the house in his favor. Further, it is on record that when the deceased was brought to the hospital, in the Accident Register, it was written as �history of fall�. According to the prosecution�s case, blood came out from the mouth and nose of the deceased, but there appears no seizure of bloodstained clothes of the deceased and chemical analysis. Thus, the inconsistent evidence by the alleged eyewitnesses as well as investigation agency would cause dent to the edifice on which the prosecution case is 14 built, and it adversely affects the substratum of the prosecution case. 20. We further find, to a certain extent, material infirmities, irregularities and contradictions in the prosecution case as also in the evidence of prosecution witnesses including the deposition of PWs 1 & 5, who are material witnesses. PW 1 in his cross examination categorically stated that his wife (PW 5) has filed a suit for partition against the accused and his family members whereas PW 5 in her cross examination denied the same. Likewise, there are contradictory statements of witnesses, primarily to the aspect of happening of incident, taking the victim to the hospital, the presence of PW1 at the time of alleged incident, detaining the accused from bus stand or from his mother-in-law�s house, recovery of material objects from the possession of accused and lodging of complaint by PW1 etc, and the whole story appears to be an utterly incredible one. More so, there was no explanation forthcoming from the prosecution side on the questions raised by the defense that soon after reaching the ABC hospital with victim, how can the PWs 1 & 5 directly approach Dr. Mohammed Ghouse Khan (PW8) 15 without going to Emergency Ward and why the Doctors at ABC hospital did not inform police when it was a medico legal case. Both the Courts below have simply noted that the variations and contradictory statements are not material in proving the guilt of the accused. We feel that the reasoning given by the Courts below is ex facie illegal. – we are of the view that there exists reasonable doubt in this case as the case of prosecution is un-supported by independent witnesses, ridden with contradictions, good motive for false prosecution and filled with suspicious circumstances. Further we are of the considered opinion that there is not only insufficiency of evidence but also lack of credibility on the trustworthiness of PWs 1 & 5 which culminated 16 into disproving the prosecution case and alleged guilt of the accused. The prosecution has, therefore, failed to establish the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt by adducing cogent evidence. We are satisfied that the Courts below completely misdirected themselves and the conviction imposed upon the accused by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error of law and perversity of approach and deserves to be set aside.

no “international commercial arbitration” = Once it is held that both the companies are incorporated in India, and, thus, they have been domiciled in India, the arbitration agreement entered into by and between them would not be an international commercial arbitration agreement and, thus, the question of applicability of sub-clause (iii) of Section 2(1)(f) would not arise.” = Indian company is the lead partner, and that the Supervisory Board constituted under the Consortium Agreement makes it clear that the lead partner really has the determining voice in that it appoints the Chairman of the said Board (undoubtedly, with the consent of other members); and the fact that the Consortium’s office is in Wadala, Mumbai as also that the lead member shall lead the arbitration proceedings, would all point to the fact that the 19 central management and control of this Consortium appears to be exercised in India and not in any foreign nation. we dismiss the petition filed under Section 11 of the Act, as there is no “international commercial arbitration” as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act for the petitioner to come to this Court. We also do not deem it necessary to go into whether the appropriate stage for invoking Arbitration has yet been reached. It would be open for the petitioner to approach the relevant court on the footing that this is not a case of an international commercial arbitration

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ARBITRATION PETITION (C) No. 28 OF 2017 M/S LARSEN … Continue reading no “international commercial arbitration” = Once it is held that both the companies are incorporated in India, and, thus, they have been domiciled in India, the arbitration agreement entered into by and between them would not be an international commercial arbitration agreement and, thus, the question of applicability of sub-clause (iii) of Section 2(1)(f) would not arise.” = Indian company is the lead partner, and that the Supervisory Board constituted under the Consortium Agreement makes it clear that the lead partner really has the determining voice in that it appoints the Chairman of the said Board (undoubtedly, with the consent of other members); and the fact that the Consortium’s office is in Wadala, Mumbai as also that the lead member shall lead the arbitration proceedings, would all point to the fact that the 19 central management and control of this Consortium appears to be exercised in India and not in any foreign nation. we dismiss the petition filed under Section 11 of the Act, as there is no “international commercial arbitration” as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act for the petitioner to come to this Court. We also do not deem it necessary to go into whether the appropriate stage for invoking Arbitration has yet been reached. It would be open for the petitioner to approach the relevant court on the footing that this is not a case of an international commercial arbitration

we dismiss the petition filed under Section 11 of the Act, as there is no “international commercial arbitration” as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act for the petitioner to come to this Court. We also do not deem it necessary to go into whether the appropriate stage for invoking Arbitration has yet been reached.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ARBITRATION PETITION (C) No. 28 OF 2017 M/S LARSEN … Continue reading we dismiss the petition filed under Section 11 of the Act, as there is no “international commercial arbitration” as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act for the petitioner to come to this Court. We also do not deem it necessary to go into whether the appropriate stage for invoking Arbitration has yet been reached.

ineligibility of resolution applicants to submit resolution plans after the introduction of Section 29A into the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), with effect from 23.11.2017.= Since it is clear that both sets of resolution plans that were submitted to the Resolution Professional, even on 2.4.2018, are hit by Section 29A(c), and since the proviso to Section 29A(c) will not apply as the corporate debtors related to AMIPL and Numetal have not paid off their respective NPAs, ordinarily, these appeals would have been disposed of by merely declaring both resolution applicants to be ineligible under Section 29A(c). Shri Subramanium, on behalf of the Committee of Creditors, requested us to give one more opportunity to the parties before us to pay off their corporate debtors’ respective debts in accordance with Section 29A, as the best resolution plan can then be selected by the requisite majority of the Committee of Creditors, so that all dues could be cleared as soon as possible. Acceding to this request, in order to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and also for the reason that the law on Section 29A has been laid down for the first time by this judgment, we give one more opportunity to both resolution applicants to pay 154 off the NPAs of their related corporate debtors within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this judgment, in accordance with the proviso to Section 29A(c). If such payments are made within the aforesaid period, both resolution applicants can resubmit their resolution plans dated 2.4.2018 to the Committee of Creditors, who are then given a period of 8 weeks from this date, to accept, by the requisite majority, the best amongst the plans submitted, including the resolution plan submitted by Vedanta. We make it clear that in the event that no plan is found worthy of acceptance by the requisite majority of the Committee of Creditors, the corporate debtor, i.e. ESIL, shall go into liquidation.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs.9402-9405 OF 2018 ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED … Continue reading ineligibility of resolution applicants to submit resolution plans after the introduction of Section 29A into the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), with effect from 23.11.2017.= Since it is clear that both sets of resolution plans that were submitted to the Resolution Professional, even on 2.4.2018, are hit by Section 29A(c), and since the proviso to Section 29A(c) will not apply as the corporate debtors related to AMIPL and Numetal have not paid off their respective NPAs, ordinarily, these appeals would have been disposed of by merely declaring both resolution applicants to be ineligible under Section 29A(c). Shri Subramanium, on behalf of the Committee of Creditors, requested us to give one more opportunity to the parties before us to pay off their corporate debtors’ respective debts in accordance with Section 29A, as the best resolution plan can then be selected by the requisite majority of the Committee of Creditors, so that all dues could be cleared as soon as possible. Acceding to this request, in order to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and also for the reason that the law on Section 29A has been laid down for the first time by this judgment, we give one more opportunity to both resolution applicants to pay 154 off the NPAs of their related corporate debtors within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this judgment, in accordance with the proviso to Section 29A(c). If such payments are made within the aforesaid period, both resolution applicants can resubmit their resolution plans dated 2.4.2018 to the Committee of Creditors, who are then given a period of 8 weeks from this date, to accept, by the requisite majority, the best amongst the plans submitted, including the resolution plan submitted by Vedanta. We make it clear that in the event that no plan is found worthy of acceptance by the requisite majority of the Committee of Creditors, the corporate debtor, i.e. ESIL, shall go into liquidation.

Order 27 Rule 5 of the Code = The parties, however, on the next date of hearing expressed that it is not possible to come to any mutually acceptable terms due to myriad reasons. The parties, however, requested to refer the matter to any sole Arbitrator and left it to the Court to pass appropriate orders in that behalf including an order appointing an Arbitrator to decide the dispute(s) by an award. We, accordingly, request Mr. Justice R.V. Raveendran­ former Judge of this Court to act as a sole Arbitrator for deciding the dispute(s), which have arisen between the parties to this appeal.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.10203 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. … Continue reading Order 27 Rule 5 of the Code = The parties, however, on the next date of hearing expressed that it is not possible to come to any mutually acceptable terms due to myriad reasons. The parties, however, requested to refer the matter to any sole Arbitrator and left it to the Court to pass appropriate orders in that behalf including an order appointing an Arbitrator to decide the dispute(s) by an award. We, accordingly, request Mr. Justice R.V. Raveendran­ former Judge of this Court to act as a sole Arbitrator for deciding the dispute(s), which have arisen between the parties to this appeal.

In the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate (PW-9), the deceased-Laxmi Rani has clearly submitted about the overt act of the appellant pouring kerosene and setting her on fire. Having regard to the evidence of PW1, father of the deceased-Laxmi Rani and the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate (PW-9), the offence would fall under Section 302 I.P.C. Since the State has not preferred any appeal against the acquittal of the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. and since the occurrence was of the year 1986, we do not propose to go into this aspect any further. (7) Suffice to note that the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 I.P.C. is to be upheld. Since, it is brought in 4 evidence that the deceased-Laxmi Rani was subjected to harassment at the hands of the appellant, we do not find any reason warranting interference with the conviction of the appellant and the sentence of imprisonment awarded to him. (8) The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No(s). 1597 OF 2009 KANAILAL SARKAR Appellant(s) … Continue reading In the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate (PW-9), the deceased-Laxmi Rani has clearly submitted about the overt act of the appellant pouring kerosene and setting her on fire. Having regard to the evidence of PW1, father of the deceased-Laxmi Rani and the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate (PW-9), the offence would fall under Section 302 I.P.C. Since the State has not preferred any appeal against the acquittal of the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. and since the occurrence was of the year 1986, we do not propose to go into this aspect any further. (7) Suffice to note that the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 I.P.C. is to be upheld. Since, it is brought in 4 evidence that the deceased-Laxmi Rani was subjected to harassment at the hands of the appellant, we do not find any reason warranting interference with the conviction of the appellant and the sentence of imprisonment awarded to him. (8) The appeal is accordingly dismissed.