whether the temple and its premises had been endowed by the father of the appellants, as otherwise evidenced by Exh.B6 or otherwise in accordance with the law and the procedure prescribed therefor for further consequential action, as warranted = In the wake of the above and on a consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, this appeal is disposed of with a direction to the appellants to file an appropriate representation before the concerned authority under the Act in support of their claim that the temple and its premises are the exclusive private property of theirs and their family and had not been endowed for wakf or charitable/public purposes.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6460 OF 2008 VIJENDRA KUMAR & ORS. … Continue reading whether the temple and its premises had been endowed by the father of the appellants, as otherwise evidenced by Exh.B6 or otherwise in accordance with the law and the procedure prescribed therefor for further consequential action, as warranted = In the wake of the above and on a consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, this appeal is disposed of with a direction to the appellants to file an appropriate representation before the concerned authority under the Act in support of their claim that the temple and its premises are the exclusive private property of theirs and their family and had not been endowed for wakf or charitable/public purposes.

when the validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings ? = dicta of the Supreme Court in Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 which held that “the validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it. But in the instant case there was no such inherent lack of jurisdiction.” – The suit which was decreed on 30 May 2009 was a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act which in any event, did not require a determination of the question of title. The earlier suit was a suit for injunction. The finding of fact which has been arrived at is to the effect that the land in question had ceased to be agricultural in nature on the date of the institution of the suit. Hence, it cannot be held that the decree of the trial court was a nullity. The land was not governed, as a result, by the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 since it was not agricultural and the bar under Section 185 was not attracted. There was no inherent lack of jurisdiction and the objection to the execution of the decree was without foundation

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 022967 OF 2017 (Arising out of … Continue reading when the validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings ? = dicta of the Supreme Court in Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 which held that “the validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it. But in the instant case there was no such inherent lack of jurisdiction.” – The suit which was decreed on 30 May 2009 was a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act which in any event, did not require a determination of the question of title. The earlier suit was a suit for injunction. The finding of fact which has been arrived at is to the effect that the land in question had ceased to be agricultural in nature on the date of the institution of the suit. Hence, it cannot be held that the decree of the trial court was a nullity. The land was not governed, as a result, by the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 since it was not agricultural and the bar under Section 185 was not attracted. There was no inherent lack of jurisdiction and the objection to the execution of the decree was without foundation

petition for consent divorce – one of the party not turned up – family court dismissed – High court too dismissed – apex court held that First, the parties have admittedly entered into an Agreement/MOU dated 30.12.2014 (Annexure-P8) agreeing therein to get their marriage dissolved by obtaining decree from the Court. Second, the Agreement/MOU bears the signatures of the appellant and respondent. Third, respondent never denied her signature on the Agreement/MOU nor its execution and nor its contents. Fourth, both the parties pursuant to Agreement/MOU actually filed an application under Section 13-B of the Act seeking dissolution of their marriage duly signed. Fifth, the respondent never stated before the Family 5 Court during the cooling period of six months that she wants to wriggle out of the application and does not wish to give her consent for mutual divorce. Sixth, the respondent also did not appear in person before the High Court and nor filed any affidavit except to say through her lawyer. Seventh, parties have been living separately for the last four years due to which their marriage has become irretrievable and there is no point in keeping such marriage alive because when asked the appellant whether he is prepared to continue with the marriage and would like to live with the respondent, his lawyer declined. Lastly, despite service of the notice of this appeal, the respondent too has also not appeared in this Court on any of the dates of hearing and nor sent any letter/affidavit/application or written request of any kind so as to know her stand in the appeal. This shows that the respondent is also not interested in 6 keeping the marital relations alive with the appellant. It is for all these reasons, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside. As a consequence, the joint petition (O.P. No.9 of 2015) filed by the appellant and the respondent under Section 13-B of the Act in the Family Court (City Civil Court) at Hyderabad is allowed.The marriage between the appellant and the respondent performed on 11.08.2013 is accordingly dissolved by decree of divorce.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 22913 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP … Continue reading petition for consent divorce – one of the party not turned up – family court dismissed – High court too dismissed – apex court held that First, the parties have admittedly entered into an Agreement/MOU dated 30.12.2014 (Annexure-P8) agreeing therein to get their marriage dissolved by obtaining decree from the Court. Second, the Agreement/MOU bears the signatures of the appellant and respondent. Third, respondent never denied her signature on the Agreement/MOU nor its execution and nor its contents. Fourth, both the parties pursuant to Agreement/MOU actually filed an application under Section 13-B of the Act seeking dissolution of their marriage duly signed. Fifth, the respondent never stated before the Family 5 Court during the cooling period of six months that she wants to wriggle out of the application and does not wish to give her consent for mutual divorce. Sixth, the respondent also did not appear in person before the High Court and nor filed any affidavit except to say through her lawyer. Seventh, parties have been living separately for the last four years due to which their marriage has become irretrievable and there is no point in keeping such marriage alive because when asked the appellant whether he is prepared to continue with the marriage and would like to live with the respondent, his lawyer declined. Lastly, despite service of the notice of this appeal, the respondent too has also not appeared in this Court on any of the dates of hearing and nor sent any letter/affidavit/application or written request of any kind so as to know her stand in the appeal. This shows that the respondent is also not interested in 6 keeping the marital relations alive with the appellant. It is for all these reasons, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside. As a consequence, the joint petition (O.P. No.9 of 2015) filed by the appellant and the respondent under Section 13-B of the Act in the Family Court (City Civil Court) at Hyderabad is allowed.The marriage between the appellant and the respondent performed on 11.08.2013 is accordingly dissolved by decree of divorce.

1. Who is the prior user of the word “Orchid/Royal Orchid” ? 2. Whether the trademark “Orchid” of the third respondent are deceptively similar and the adoption of the said trademark by the third respondent is dishonest ?” – it cannot be said that the two logos/marks would not give rise to confusion amongst the customers using the Hotels. As the marks/logos were largely similar, the High Court took the view that even on the second question formulated by it the writ petition has to be allowed and the order of the IPAB set aside.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.6131 OF 2015 ROYAL ORCHID … Continue reading 1. Who is the prior user of the word “Orchid/Royal Orchid” ? 2. Whether the trademark “Orchid” of the third respondent are deceptively similar and the adoption of the said trademark by the third respondent is dishonest ?” – it cannot be said that the two logos/marks would not give rise to confusion amongst the customers using the Hotels. As the marks/logos were largely similar, the High Court took the view that even on the second question formulated by it the writ petition has to be allowed and the order of the IPAB set aside.

seeking a decree of permanent injunction for infringement of trade mark, =in order to protect the plaintiff’s trade marks ‘TOYOTA’, ‘TOYOTA INNOVA’, ‘TOYOTA DEVICE’ and the mark ‘Prius’ of which the plaintiff claimed to be a prior user. = If goodwill or reputation in the particular jurisdiction (in India) is not established by the plaintiff, no other issue really would need any further examination to determine the extent of the plaintiff’s right in the action of passing off that it had brought against the defendants in the Delhi High Court. = eventually agree with the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court that the brand name of the car Prius had not acquired the degree of goodwill, reputation and the market or popularity in the Indian market so as to vest in the plaintiff the necessary attributes of the right of a prior user so as to successfully maintain an action of passing off even against the registered owner.- We cannot help but also to observe that in the present case the plaintiff’s delayed approach to the Courts has remained unexplained. Such delay cannot be allowed to work to the prejudice of the defendants who had kept on using its registered mark to market its goods during the inordinately long period of silence maintained by the plaintiff.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs.5375-5377 OF 2017 TOYOTA JIDOSHA KABUSHIKI KAISHA … Continue reading seeking a decree of permanent injunction for infringement of trade mark, =in order to protect the plaintiff’s trade marks ‘TOYOTA’, ‘TOYOTA INNOVA’, ‘TOYOTA DEVICE’ and the mark ‘Prius’ of which the plaintiff claimed to be a prior user. = If goodwill or reputation in the particular jurisdiction (in India) is not established by the plaintiff, no other issue really would need any further examination to determine the extent of the plaintiff’s right in the action of passing off that it had brought against the defendants in the Delhi High Court. = eventually agree with the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court that the brand name of the car Prius had not acquired the degree of goodwill, reputation and the market or popularity in the Indian market so as to vest in the plaintiff the necessary attributes of the right of a prior user so as to successfully maintain an action of passing off even against the registered owner.- We cannot help but also to observe that in the present case the plaintiff’s delayed approach to the Courts has remained unexplained. Such delay cannot be allowed to work to the prejudice of the defendants who had kept on using its registered mark to market its goods during the inordinately long period of silence maintained by the plaintiff.

Institute of Nano Science and Technology Campus at Knowledge City, Sector 81, Mohali,=We have already noticed that three expert committees have scrutinized Respondent No.1’s tender and found Respondent No.1 to be ineligible. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court expressly states that no malafides are involved in the present case. Equally, while setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench does not state that the three expert committees have arrived at a perverse conclusion. To merely set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and then jump to the conclusion that Respondent No.1’s tender was clearly eligible, would be directly contrary to the judgments aforestated. The Division Bench, in setting aside the aforesaid judgment, has clearly gone outside the bounds of judicial review. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restore that of the learned Single Judge.- We record the aforesaid statement and order that the tender awarded to Respondent No.1 dated 20th August, 2017, based upon the Division Bench judgment, must be set aside, and the award of the tender to the Appellant must be restored. We hasten to add that it will be open to Respondent No.2 to accept Dr. Singhvi’s offer that the project will be executed at the amount indicated by Respondent No.1.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 21858 OF 2017 (Arising out of Special … Continue reading Institute of Nano Science and Technology Campus at Knowledge City, Sector 81, Mohali,=We have already noticed that three expert committees have scrutinized Respondent No.1’s tender and found Respondent No.1 to be ineligible. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court expressly states that no malafides are involved in the present case. Equally, while setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench does not state that the three expert committees have arrived at a perverse conclusion. To merely set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and then jump to the conclusion that Respondent No.1’s tender was clearly eligible, would be directly contrary to the judgments aforestated. The Division Bench, in setting aside the aforesaid judgment, has clearly gone outside the bounds of judicial review. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restore that of the learned Single Judge.- We record the aforesaid statement and order that the tender awarded to Respondent No.1 dated 20th August, 2017, based upon the Division Bench judgment, must be set aside, and the award of the tender to the Appellant must be restored. We hasten to add that it will be open to Respondent No.2 to accept Dr. Singhvi’s offer that the project will be executed at the amount indicated by Respondent No.1.

bail petition whether it is filed under Section 438 or Section 439 of the Code=The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are: (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Puran v. Rambilas,(2001) 6 SCC – where earlier bail applications have been rejected there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent application for bail should be granted. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay)”

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2188 OF 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.9672 … Continue reading bail petition whether it is filed under Section 438 or Section 439 of the Code=The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are: (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Puran v. Rambilas,(2001) 6 SCC – where earlier bail applications have been rejected there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent application for bail should be granted. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay)”