“Orphanage or Places for Child Abuse”. – orphanages in Mahabalipuram in Tamil Nadu, run by NGOs as well as government institutions were reportedly involved in systematic sexual abuse of children. A sting operation indicated that sexual services of children were being provided to foreigners as well as Indian tourists and that the rates of children whose sexual services were being taken were fixed over telephone or in a meeting at the orphanage. = children in need of care and protection we leave these issues open for consideration and grant liberty to the learned Amicus to move an appropriate application in this regard including any application for modification or clarification of the directions given above. The Union of India is directed to communicate our directions to the concerned Ministry or Department of each State and Union Territory for implementation and to collate necessary information regarding the implementation of these directions with the assistance of the National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights and the State Commission for the Protection of Child Rights. A status report in this regard should be filed in this Court on or before 15thJanuary, 2018. The Registry will list this case immediately thereafter.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 102 OF 2007 Re: Exploitation of … Continue reading “Orphanage or Places for Child Abuse”. – orphanages in Mahabalipuram in Tamil Nadu, run by NGOs as well as government institutions were reportedly involved in systematic sexual abuse of children. A sting operation indicated that sexual services of children were being provided to foreigners as well as Indian tourists and that the rates of children whose sexual services were being taken were fixed over telephone or in a meeting at the orphanage. = children in need of care and protection we leave these issues open for consideration and grant liberty to the learned Amicus to move an appropriate application in this regard including any application for modification or clarification of the directions given above. The Union of India is directed to communicate our directions to the concerned Ministry or Department of each State and Union Territory for implementation and to collate necessary information regarding the implementation of these directions with the assistance of the National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights and the State Commission for the Protection of Child Rights. A status report in this regard should be filed in this Court on or before 15thJanuary, 2018. The Registry will list this case immediately thereafter.

Land acquisition Act- In the matter on hand, none of the parties have led oral evidence in support of their respective cases. However, certified copies of the two Sale Deeds are available on record which came to be produced by the parties before the Reference Court. The Sale Deed dated 24.01.1974 relied upon by the appellants depicts the price of one bigha of the property sold through the said sale deed was at Rs. 7,000/-, whereas the respondents relied upon the certified copy of Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 which shows that the land therein was sold at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per bigha under the said Sale Deed.-Though the Reference Court as well as the High Court have assigned valid reasons for not relying upon the Sale Deed dated 24.01.1974 relied upon by the claimants, have erred in ignoring to consider the Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 produced by the respondents. The Reference Court as well as the High Court have merely observed, in the course of the judgment, that certified copy of such Sale Deed is produced by the respondents, but no further discussion was made as to why the said Sale Deed was not considered.- we do not find any reason to ignore the Sale Deed produced by the respondents in support of their case. As mentioned supra, the Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 is in respect of 11 bighas and 10 biswas of land situated in the village Roshan Pura. As per the said Sale Deed, the price per bigha of the land involved therein would be about Rs. 2000/-. Prima facie, the land in question as well as the land covered under the Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 are approximately having the similar dimension and are situated in the same village i.e. Roshan Pura. The respondents being the beneficiaries under the acquisition have themselves relied upon the Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 as the sole basis to oppose the prayer of the claimants. Some sort of guess work is necessary while determining compensation for the land acquired. One has to perceive from the view point of the prudent purchaser. As the acquisition is of the year 1973, we do not wish to remit the matter to Reference Court. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the matter, in our considered opinion, the compensation may be determined relying upon the Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 particularly when there is no other reliable material on record. Since the land under the said Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 was valued at a sum of Rs. 2,000/- per bigha, and as the land in question was acquired in the year 1973, the compensation can be determined by adding 15% of the value of the sale consideration per year keeping in mind the escalation in price of the lands day by day. Normally 15% escalation is taken, per year by this Court in recent times while quantifying compensation. Thus, the claimants would be entitled to Rs. 2,600/- per bigha.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5630 of 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P. … Continue reading Land acquisition Act- In the matter on hand, none of the parties have led oral evidence in support of their respective cases. However, certified copies of the two Sale Deeds are available on record which came to be produced by the parties before the Reference Court. The Sale Deed dated 24.01.1974 relied upon by the appellants depicts the price of one bigha of the property sold through the said sale deed was at Rs. 7,000/-, whereas the respondents relied upon the certified copy of Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 which shows that the land therein was sold at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per bigha under the said Sale Deed.-Though the Reference Court as well as the High Court have assigned valid reasons for not relying upon the Sale Deed dated 24.01.1974 relied upon by the claimants, have erred in ignoring to consider the Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 produced by the respondents. The Reference Court as well as the High Court have merely observed, in the course of the judgment, that certified copy of such Sale Deed is produced by the respondents, but no further discussion was made as to why the said Sale Deed was not considered.- we do not find any reason to ignore the Sale Deed produced by the respondents in support of their case. As mentioned supra, the Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 is in respect of 11 bighas and 10 biswas of land situated in the village Roshan Pura. As per the said Sale Deed, the price per bigha of the land involved therein would be about Rs. 2000/-. Prima facie, the land in question as well as the land covered under the Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 are approximately having the similar dimension and are situated in the same village i.e. Roshan Pura. The respondents being the beneficiaries under the acquisition have themselves relied upon the Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 as the sole basis to oppose the prayer of the claimants. Some sort of guess work is necessary while determining compensation for the land acquired. One has to perceive from the view point of the prudent purchaser. As the acquisition is of the year 1973, we do not wish to remit the matter to Reference Court. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the matter, in our considered opinion, the compensation may be determined relying upon the Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 particularly when there is no other reliable material on record. Since the land under the said Sale Deed dated 19.03.1971 was valued at a sum of Rs. 2,000/- per bigha, and as the land in question was acquired in the year 1973, the compensation can be determined by adding 15% of the value of the sale consideration per year keeping in mind the escalation in price of the lands day by day. Normally 15% escalation is taken, per year by this Court in recent times while quantifying compensation. Thus, the claimants would be entitled to Rs. 2,600/- per bigha.

Whether the subsequent purchasers/assignees/power of attorney holders, etc., have locus standi to file a petition for a declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2013 Act”), is the only issue arising for consideration in these cases.=Thus, the subsequent purchaser, the assignee, the successor in interest, the power of attorney, etc., are all persons who are interested in compensation/land owners/affected persons in terms of the 2013 Act and such persons are entitled to file a case for a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is a declaration qua the land wherein indisputably they have an interest and they are affected by such acquisition. For such a declaration, it cannot be said that the respondents/writ petitioners do not have any locus standi.- In the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, the appellants are given a period of six months to exercise its liberty granted under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for initiation of the acquisition proceedings afresh.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6112 OF 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. … Continue reading Whether the subsequent purchasers/assignees/power of attorney holders, etc., have locus standi to file a petition for a declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2013 Act”), is the only issue arising for consideration in these cases.=Thus, the subsequent purchaser, the assignee, the successor in interest, the power of attorney, etc., are all persons who are interested in compensation/land owners/affected persons in terms of the 2013 Act and such persons are entitled to file a case for a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is a declaration qua the land wherein indisputably they have an interest and they are affected by such acquisition. For such a declaration, it cannot be said that the respondents/writ petitioners do not have any locus standi.- In the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, the appellants are given a period of six months to exercise its liberty granted under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for initiation of the acquisition proceedings afresh.

failed to appreciate = but not discussed as to why their testimony as to the fact that married sister-in-law (of the deceased) and her husband used to live in village Sabutar, is not believed. – we find that both the courts below have erred in law in holding that the charge under Section 304B read with Section 34 IPC stood proved as against the present appellants. In our opinion, in view of the evidence discussed above, it cannot be said that it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the present appellants, who are sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the deceased, tortured the victim for any demand of dowry. In our opinion, in the present case which is based on circumstantial evidence it cannot be said that appellants had any common intention with the husband of the deceased in commission of the crime. It is sufficiently shown on the record that they used to live in a different village. Therefore, we are inclined to allow the present appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, and conviction and sentence recorded as against the present appellants Bibi Parwana Khatoon @ Parwana Khatoon and Md. Hasan @ Hasan Raja is set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURSIDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 888 OF 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) … Continue reading failed to appreciate = but not discussed as to why their testimony as to the fact that married sister-in-law (of the deceased) and her husband used to live in village Sabutar, is not believed. – we find that both the courts below have erred in law in holding that the charge under Section 304B read with Section 34 IPC stood proved as against the present appellants. In our opinion, in view of the evidence discussed above, it cannot be said that it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the present appellants, who are sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the deceased, tortured the victim for any demand of dowry. In our opinion, in the present case which is based on circumstantial evidence it cannot be said that appellants had any common intention with the husband of the deceased in commission of the crime. It is sufficiently shown on the record that they used to live in a different village. Therefore, we are inclined to allow the present appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, and conviction and sentence recorded as against the present appellants Bibi Parwana Khatoon @ Parwana Khatoon and Md. Hasan @ Hasan Raja is set aside.

the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short, the ‘Act of 1986’).= the detention order in this case is vitiated by taking into account incidents so far back in the past as would have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without a trial. The satisfaction of the authority is not in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Incidents which are stale, cease to have relevance to the subject matter of the enquiry and must be treated as extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute.- The influence of the stale incidents in the detention order is too pernicious to be ignored, and the order must therefore go; both on account of being vitiated due to malice in law and for taking into account matters which ought not to have been taken into account There is another reason why the detention order is unjustified. It was passed when the accused was in jail in Crime No. 221 of 2016. His custody in jail for the said offence was converted into custody under the impugned detention order. The incident involved in this offence is sometime in the year 2002-2003. The detenu could not have been detained preventively by taking this stale incident into account, more so when he was in jail.- In Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Ors.[9], this Court observed as follows:- “6. On a reading of the grounds, particularly the paragraph which we have extracted above, it is clear that the order of detention was passed as the detaining authority was apprehensive that in case the detenu was released on bail he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised. Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under-trial prisoner was likely to get bail an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed.” – Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we allow this appeal, and set aside the aforesaid detention order dated 23.11.2016 passed by the Respondent No.2 – Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda Commissionerate, Rangareddy District, Telangana, as also the impugned judgment and order dated 22.03.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No.43671 of 2016.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 885 OF 2017 SAMA ARUNA ….APPELLANT(S) VERSUS … Continue reading the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short, the ‘Act of 1986’).= the detention order in this case is vitiated by taking into account incidents so far back in the past as would have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without a trial. The satisfaction of the authority is not in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Incidents which are stale, cease to have relevance to the subject matter of the enquiry and must be treated as extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute.- The influence of the stale incidents in the detention order is too pernicious to be ignored, and the order must therefore go; both on account of being vitiated due to malice in law and for taking into account matters which ought not to have been taken into account There is another reason why the detention order is unjustified. It was passed when the accused was in jail in Crime No. 221 of 2016. His custody in jail for the said offence was converted into custody under the impugned detention order. The incident involved in this offence is sometime in the year 2002-2003. The detenu could not have been detained preventively by taking this stale incident into account, more so when he was in jail.- In Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Ors.[9], this Court observed as follows:- “6. On a reading of the grounds, particularly the paragraph which we have extracted above, it is clear that the order of detention was passed as the detaining authority was apprehensive that in case the detenu was released on bail he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised. Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under-trial prisoner was likely to get bail an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed.” – Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we allow this appeal, and set aside the aforesaid detention order dated 23.11.2016 passed by the Respondent No.2 – Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda Commissionerate, Rangareddy District, Telangana, as also the impugned judgment and order dated 22.03.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No.43671 of 2016.

the word ‘payable’ in Section 40(a)(ia) would mean only when the amount is payable and not when it is actually paid. Grammatically, it may be accepted that the two words, i.e. ‘payable’ and ‘paid’, denote different meanings. = The liability to deduct tax at source under the provisions of Chapter XVII is mandatory. A person responsible for paying any sum is also liable to deposit the amount in the Government account. All the sections in Chapter XVII-B require a person to deduct the tax at source at the rates specified therein. The requirement in each of the sections is preceded by the word “shall”. The provisions are, therefore, mandatory. There is nothing in any of the sections that would warrant our reading the word “shall” as “may”. The point of time at which the deduction is to be made also establishes that the provisions are mandatory. For instance, under Section 194C, a person responsible for paying the sum is required to deduct the tax “at the time of credit of such sum to the account of the contractor or at the time of the payment thereof. ……”= In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the view taken by the High Courts of Punjab & Haryana, Madras and Calcutta is the correct view and the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in CIT v. Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd., (2013) 357 ITR 642 did not decide the question of law correctly. Thus, insofar as the judgment of the Allahabad High Court is concerned, we overrule the same. Consequences of the aforesaid discussion will be to answer the question against the appellant/assessee thereby approving the view taken by the High Court.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5512 OF 2017 |M/S. PALAM GAS SERVICE … Continue reading the word ‘payable’ in Section 40(a)(ia) would mean only when the amount is payable and not when it is actually paid. Grammatically, it may be accepted that the two words, i.e. ‘payable’ and ‘paid’, denote different meanings. = The liability to deduct tax at source under the provisions of Chapter XVII is mandatory. A person responsible for paying any sum is also liable to deposit the amount in the Government account. All the sections in Chapter XVII-B require a person to deduct the tax at source at the rates specified therein. The requirement in each of the sections is preceded by the word “shall”. The provisions are, therefore, mandatory. There is nothing in any of the sections that would warrant our reading the word “shall” as “may”. The point of time at which the deduction is to be made also establishes that the provisions are mandatory. For instance, under Section 194C, a person responsible for paying the sum is required to deduct the tax “at the time of credit of such sum to the account of the contractor or at the time of the payment thereof. ……”= In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the view taken by the High Courts of Punjab & Haryana, Madras and Calcutta is the correct view and the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in CIT v. Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd., (2013) 357 ITR 642 did not decide the question of law correctly. Thus, insofar as the judgment of the Allahabad High Court is concerned, we overrule the same. Consequences of the aforesaid discussion will be to answer the question against the appellant/assessee thereby approving the view taken by the High Court.

conviction of the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 363, 367, 376(2)(f) and 201 IPC and various sentences imposed upon the petitioner including death sentence under Section 302 IPC and life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) IPC. In view of the decision of this Court in Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India and others.[1], these review petitions were listed in Court for oral hearing.= Principles (1) The court has to apply the test to determine, if it was the “rarest of rare” case for imposition of a death sentence. (2) In the opinion of the court, imposition of any other punishment i.e. life imprisonment would be completely inadequate and would not meet the ends of justice. (3) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. (4) The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be cautiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all relevant considerations. (5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner (extent of brutality and inhumanity, etc.) in which the crime was committed and the circumstances leading to commission of such heinous crime = after the Judgment under review, the petitioner has completed Bachelors Preparatory Programme offered by the Indira Gandhi National Open University enabling him to prepare for Bachelor level study and that he has also completed the Gandhi Vichar Pariksha and had participated in drawing competition organized sometime in January 2016. It is asserted that the jail record of the petitioner is without any blemish. The matter is not contested as regards Conditions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 as stated in paragraph 206 of the decision in Bachan Singh (supra) but what is now being projected is that there is a possibility of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated. Though these attempts on part of the petitioner are after the Judgment under review, we have considered the material in that behalf to see if those circumstances warrant a different view. We have given anxious consideration to the material on record but find that the aggravating circumstances namely the extreme depravity and the barbaric manner in which the crime was committed and the fact that the victim was a helpless girl of four years clearly outweigh the mitigating circumstances now brought on record. Having taken an overall view of the matter, in our considered view, no case is made out to take a different view in the matter. We, therefore, affirm the view taken in the Judgment under review and dismiss the present Review Petitions..

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Review Petition (Crl.) Nos.637-638 of 2015 IN Criminal Appeal Nos.2486-2487 … Continue reading conviction of the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 363, 367, 376(2)(f) and 201 IPC and various sentences imposed upon the petitioner including death sentence under Section 302 IPC and life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) IPC. In view of the decision of this Court in Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India and others.[1], these review petitions were listed in Court for oral hearing.= Principles (1) The court has to apply the test to determine, if it was the “rarest of rare” case for imposition of a death sentence. (2) In the opinion of the court, imposition of any other punishment i.e. life imprisonment would be completely inadequate and would not meet the ends of justice. (3) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. (4) The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be cautiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all relevant considerations. (5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner (extent of brutality and inhumanity, etc.) in which the crime was committed and the circumstances leading to commission of such heinous crime = after the Judgment under review, the petitioner has completed Bachelors Preparatory Programme offered by the Indira Gandhi National Open University enabling him to prepare for Bachelor level study and that he has also completed the Gandhi Vichar Pariksha and had participated in drawing competition organized sometime in January 2016. It is asserted that the jail record of the petitioner is without any blemish. The matter is not contested as regards Conditions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 as stated in paragraph 206 of the decision in Bachan Singh (supra) but what is now being projected is that there is a possibility of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated. Though these attempts on part of the petitioner are after the Judgment under review, we have considered the material in that behalf to see if those circumstances warrant a different view. We have given anxious consideration to the material on record but find that the aggravating circumstances namely the extreme depravity and the barbaric manner in which the crime was committed and the fact that the victim was a helpless girl of four years clearly outweigh the mitigating circumstances now brought on record. Having taken an overall view of the matter, in our considered view, no case is made out to take a different view in the matter. We, therefore, affirm the view taken in the Judgment under review and dismiss the present Review Petitions..