whether the Accused can be convicted for an offence under section 302 with the aid of Section 149 IPC.=Though the accused cannot be convicted under section 302 with the aid of S. 149 IPC in view of the above findings, they would still be liable for a lesser punishment. The common object of the unlawful assembly to attack the Appellant and others is proved. Considering the manner of the attack and the deadly weapons used, we are of the considered opinion that Accused Valerbhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-1), Unadbhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-2), Bhimabhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-3), Unadbhai Bhagabhai Vagh (A-5), Bhagwanbhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-7), Bhikabhai Jinabhai Vagh (A-8), Hasurbhai Bhikhabhai Vagh (A- 11), Bhanabhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-12), Patabhai @ Aatabhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A- 13) and Bhavabhai Jikarbhai Vagh (A-14) are guilty of offence under Section 326 read with 149 IPC. We are informed that the accused have already undergone a sentence of seven and a half years. Considering the fact that the incident occurred in the year 1998 and that there is no complaint from either side about any further violence since then we opine that the sentence can be limited to the period undergone.

[pic]REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2339 of 2010

NAJABHAI DESURBHAI WAGH

…. Appellant(s)

Versus

VALERABHAI DEGANBHAI VAGH & ORS.

….Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

By a Judgment dated 24.06.2003, the Second Fast  Track  Judge,  Amreli

convicted Accused Nos.1 to 14  who  are  Respondents  1  to  14  herein  for

committing an offence under Section 302 read with Sections  149/34  IPC  and

sentenced them to life imprisonment and a penalty of Rs.5,000/-  in  default

of which they shall undergo six months further  imprisonment.   The  Accused

were also found guilty for the offences under  Sections  324  and  325  read

with 149/34 IPC for  which  they  were  sentenced  to  six  months  rigorous

imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/- in default of which  they  shall  undergo

two months imprisonment.  Accused Nos.1, 2  and  10  were  directed  to  pay

Rs.10,000/- each as compensation to  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  Unadbhai

Desurbhai under Section 357 of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973.   The

remaining accused were directed to jointly  pay  Rs.20,000/-as  compensation

to the heirs.

Accused Nos.1 to 14 filed an Appeal before the  High  Court  of  Gujarat  at

Ahmedabad challenging their  convictions  and  sentences.   The  High  Court

allowed the appeal partly by acquitting Accused Nos.1 and 2  of  the  charge

under Section 302  read  with  Section  34/149  IPC.   The  convictions  and

sentences under Section 324 and 325 read with Section 34/149 IPC in  respect

of Accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 were maintained.   The convictions  and  sentences

of Accused No. 3 to 9 and 11 to 14  under  Section  302  read  with  Section

34/149 IPC and 324 and 325 read with Section  34/149  IPC  were  set  aside.

The conviction of Accused No.10 under Section 302 read with  Section  149/34

was converted to  a  conviction  for  the  offence  under  Section  302  IPC

simpliciter and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  life.

The Complainant has filed this Appeal aggrieved by  the  judgment  of  the

High Court.

The FIR was recorded on 24.03.1998 by the Sub-Inspector  of  Police,  Rajula

on a complaint made by the Appellant herein. According to  the  Complainant,

an electrical light pole near his house was broken down by  the  tractor  of

Accused No.1 on 23.03.1998.   The  Complainant  cautioned  Accused  No.1  to

drive the tractor carefully.   Accused No.1 took offence  and  informed  the

Complainant that he would come back at 06:00 PM to settle  the  matter.   At

06:00 PM, Accused Nos.1 to 14, armed with axe, iron pipe and spear  came  on

a tractor to the Complainant’s house.   Jagabhai Bhayabhai was  hit  by  the

tractor due to which he sustained injury on  his  legs.  The  other  accused

attacked the Complainant, his brother  Unabhai  Desurbhai,  Jaga  Bhaya  and

Bayabhai.  Bhagwan Bhikha (Accused No.7) gave a blow with an iron T pipe  on

the left eyebrow of the complainant. Bhima Degan (Accused No.  3)  inflicted

an  injury  by  spear  on  the  left  side  of  the  complainant’s  stomach.

Bhagabhai  Rambhai,  Rambhai  Bhayabhai,  Lakhman  Sumara   and   Raningbhai

Tapubhai came to the spot and they were also attacked  by  Accused  No.1  to

14. Unadbhai Desurbhai, Bhikabhai Desurbhai, Bhaga Ram  and  Lakhman  Sumara

sustained injuries on their heads. The Complainant  and  the  other  injured

persons shouted for help and the accused seeing the villagers fled from  the

spot.  The injured were taken for  treatment  in  an  ambulance  of  Gujarat

Peeparu Port Ltd. Unadbhai Desurbhai died  on  26.03.1998  while  undergoing

treatment.  The accused were charged under Section 147,  148,  504,  506(2),

323, 324, 325, 326, 302 read with 34/149 IPC and 135 of  the  Bombay  Police

Act.

In the trial, the prosecution examined 21 witnesses and relied upon  several

documents.  Seven eye-witnesses including the Complainant were examined.  To

prove the injuries PWs 14, 15,  16  and  17  were  examined.  Dr.  Popatbhai

Bhaliya (PW17) was the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre,  Rajula  on

24.03.98.  He examined the Complainant, the deceased Unadbhai Desurbhai  and

other injured persons. He proved  the  medical  certificates  given  by  him

regarding the injuries. Dr. Hemangbhai Vasavdawas who treated  the  deceased

was examined as PW15.  He  stated  that  the  cause  of  death  was  due  to

haemorrhage  caused  in  the  head  by  a  solid  blunt  object.   PW14  Dr.

Govindbhai Parmar, conducted the post mortem of the dead  body  of  Unadbhai

Desurbhai. Dr. Madhukant (PW16) was examined to  speak  about  the  injuries

caused to Rainingbhai Tapu (PW5).    Relying  upon  the  ocular  testimonies

which were corroborated by the medical evidence, the Trial Court  held  that

the accused formed an unlawful assembly and  attacked  the  Complainant  and

others.  The right to private defence set up by the accused was rejected  by

the Trial Court.  On a detailed consideration of  the  material  on  record,

the Trial Court found  all  the  Accused  guilty  of  having  committed  the

offence under Section 302 read with 149/34 IPC for  the  death  of  Unadbhai

Desurbhai.  The Accused were also found guilty of causing  injuries  to  the

others and were convicted under Section 324 and 325 read with 149/34 IPC.

The High Court held that the offence under Section 302 read with 149/34  IPC

was not made out on the ground that there was a  cross  case  and  that  the

Accused neither formed an unlawful assembly nor was there  previous  concert

to cause death.   The High Court held that there was one injury on the  head

of the deceased Unadbhai Desurbhai and Accused Nos.1, 2 and 10 were  alleged

to have caused the injury.  As that injury on the head can be attributed  to

Accused No.10, he was convicted under Section 302 IPC. The High  Court  held

that Accused No.1 and 2 cannot be held responsible for the said  injury  and

acquitted them of the offence under Section 302 read with  149/34  IPC.  The

remaining accused were also acquitted for  the  offence  under  Section  302

read with 149/34 IPC.  The conviction and sentence under  Section  324,  325

read with 149/34 IPC were maintained.

Lakshmanbhai Bhaikhabhai, Accused No.10 did not prefer  any  appeal  against

his conviction and  sentence.  We  are  informed  that  he  has  served  his

sentence.  We are also informed that  during  the  pendency  of  the  appeal

before the High Court, Accused Nos.4, 6 and 9 have  died  against  whom  the

Appeal abates.

Ms.Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior  Counsel,  appearing  for  the  Appellant

submitted that the High Court committed a serious error  in  acquitting  the

Accused under Section 302 read with 149 IPC in the facts  and  circumstances

of the case. She submitted that the judgment of the High Court  was  cryptic

and reasons given for the acquittal of the Accused  are  unsustainable.  The

finding of the High Court that there was no previous concert to cause  death

and there was no unlawful assembly is without reference to the facts of  the

case.

Mr.  Harin  Rawal,  learned  Senior  Counsel,  appearing  for  the   Accused

submitted that the prosecution suppressed the true facts. He contended  that

the Complainant’s party were the aggressors in the fight that took place  on

24.03.1998.  He brought to our notice that Crime No.I 35 of 1998 was  lodged

at 08:30 pm on 24.03.1998 at Rajula Police  Station  by  Accused  No.2.  The

complaint preferred by the Appellant  was  lodged  15  minutes  after  their

complaint.  He took us through the record to show that there  were  injuries

received by the Accused due to the attack by the Complainant’s  party.    He

further submitted that the lights of the tractor were broken,  its  silencer

was  bent  and  its  steering  wheel  was  damaged.   He   highlighted   the

discrepancy on the question of who was driving the tractor.  He referred  to

the evidence to show that Prakash Manubhai was the driver who was injured.

Whether the High Court was right in acquitting  the  accused  under  Section

302 read with 149 IPC is the question that falls for  our  consideration  in

this case.  The  essential  ingredients  and  the  width  and  amplitude  of

Section 149 as well as its applicability to the facts of the  case  have  to

be examined. It would be relevant to refer to Section 149 IPC  which  is  as

under:

“149. Every member of unlawful  assembly  guilty  of  offence  committed  in

prosecution of common object.—If an offence is committed by  any  member  of

an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of  that  assembly,

or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely  to  be  committed

in prosecution of that  object,  every  person  who,  at  the  time  of  the

committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is  guilty  of

that offence.”

A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court analysed  Section  149  IPC  in  the

year 1873 in Queen v. Sabid Ali[1].  Phear, J., speaking for  the  majority,

held as under:

“     It seems to me clearly not the case that every offence  which  may  be

committed by one member of  an  unlawful  assembly  while  the  assembly  is

existing, i.e., while the members  are  engaged  in  the  prosecution  of  a

common object, is attributed by Section 149  to  every  other  member.   The

Section describes the offence which  is  to  be  so  attributed,  under  two

alternative forms, viz., it must be either –

1st. – An offence  committed  by  a  member  of  the  unlawful  assembly  in

prosecution of the common object of that assembly.

2nd. – An offence such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely  to

be committed in prosecution of that object.

Now, inasmuch as the continuance of the unlawful assembly  is  by  the

definition of Section 141 made conterminous  with  the  prosecution  of  the

common object, it seems tolerably  clear  that  the  Legislature  must  have

employed the words “prosecution of the common object” with  some  difference

of meaning in these two passages respectively. Also the mere fact  that  the

Legislature thought fit to express the second alternative  appears  to  show

very distinctly that it did not intend the words “in prosecution” which  are

found in the first to be equivalent “during the prosecution”;  for  if  they

were then the second alternative would have clearly been  unnecessary.   And

a comparison with this passage of the language  which  is  used  in  Section

460, where the Legislature makes all the persons concerned in  committing  a

burglary punishable with transportation  for  life,  if  any  one  of  their

number act the time of committing of burglary causes  death,  &c.,  strongly

bears out this view.  I am of opinion that an  offence,  in  order  to  fall

within the first of the above alternatives, i.e., in order to  be  committed

in the prosecution of the common object must be immediately  connected  with

that common object by virtue of the nature of the object: for  instance,  if

a body of armed men go out to fight, their common object is to cause  bodily

injury to their opponents, and in that  case  death  resulting  from  injury

caused would be homicide committed in prosecution of the common object.

And an offence will fall within the second alternative if the  members

of the assembly, for any reason, knew beforehand that it was  likely  to  be

committed in the prosecution of the common object, though not  knit  thereto

by nature of the object itself.

It seems thus, on a little  consideration,  to  be  apparent  that  the  two

alternatives of Section 149 do not cover all possible cases  of  an  offence

being committed by one member of an unlawful assembly during the  time  when

the common object of the assembly is being prosecuted.  It follows  that  in

every trial of prisoners on a charge framed under the provisions of  Section

149 of Penal Code, even when it is proved that  the  specified  offence  was

committed by one of the members of the assembly during,  so  to  speak,  the

pendency of that assembly, it yet remains an issue of fact to be  determined

on the evidence whether that offence was committed  in  prosecution  of  the

common object, as I have endeavoured to explain the meaning of  those  words

in the first part of the Section; and, if not, whether  it  was  an  offence

such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely  to  be  committed  in

the prosecution of the object.”

The Calcutta High Court was dealing with a  case  of  riot  over  a  dispute

about a piece of land between Fukeer Buksh and Sabid Ali. Tureeboollah,  who

was a member of Sabid Ali’s party of assailants, fired a gun and killed  one

Samed Ali. The Trial Court held  that  Tureeboollah  was  a  member  of  the

unlawful assembly of which  the  others  in  Sabid  Ali’s  party  were  also

members. It convicted all the accused under Section 302 read with  149  IPC.

The  High  Court  held  that  the   conviction   under   Section   149   was

unsustainable.  In a concurring opinion, Jackson J. held as follows:

“It appears to me that the construction of this Section (149),  that  is,  a

construction which shall be at once  reasonable  grammatical,  involves  two

difficulties,  or  at  least   two   points   which   call   for   attentive

consideration:-

1st – “The common object,”

2nd – or “such as the members of that assembly  knew  to  be  likely  to  be

committed in prosecution of that object.”

It has been proposed to interpret the “common  object”  in  a  precise

sense so as to indicate the exact extent of violence to  which  the  rioters

intended to go, viz., to take possession of the land by force extending,  if

need be, to wounding and the like.

This I think is not the sense in which the words were intended  to  be

understood.

They are not, it seems to me, used in the same sense  as  “the  common

intention” in Section 34, which means the intention of all whatever  it  may

have been.

The words here  seem  to  have  manifest  reference  to  the  defining

Section 141, and to point to one of the five objects, which being common  to

five or more persons assembled together, make their assembly unlawful.

For this reason, I think that any attempt to mitigate  the  rigour  of

the Section by limiting the construction of the words “common  object”  must

fail, and that any offence done by a  member  of  an  unlawful  assembly  in

prosecution of the particular one or more of the five objects  mentioned  in

Section 141, which is or are brought home to the unlawful assembly to  which

the prisoner belonged, is an offence within the meaning of  the  first  part

of the Section.”

Pontifex, J. agreed with the majority and interpreted  the  word  “knew”  in

Section 149 in the following terms:

“To bring the offence of murder as defined by the Code within  Section  149,

I think it must either necessarily flow from the prosecution of  the  common

object; or it must so probably flow  from  the  prosecution  of  the  common

object that each member might antecedently except it to happen.

The offence of murder as strictly  defined  by  the  Code  requires  a

previous intention or knowledge in  the  perpetrator;  and  to  “know”  that

murder is likely to be committed,  is  to  know  that  some  member  of  the

assembly has such previous intention or knowledge.  The word “knew” used  in

the second branch of the Section is I think advisedly used,  and  cannot  be

made to bear the sense of “might have known.” ”

This Court in Mizaji and Another v. State of U.P.[2]observing  that  various

High Courts of India had interpreted Section 149 held that  every  case  has

to be decided on its own facts. This court proceeded to  deal  with  Section

149 in detail as under:

“The first  part  of  the  section  means  that  the  offence  committed  in

prosecution of the common object must be one which is committed with a  view

to accomplish the common object. It is not necessary that there should be  a

preconcert in the sense  of  a  meeting  of  the  members  of  the  unlawful

assembly as to the common object; it is enough if it is adopted by  all  the

members and is shared by all of them. In order that the case may fall  under

the first part the offence committed must be connected immediately with  the

common object of the unlawful assembly of which the  accused  were  members.

Even if the offence committed is not in direct  prosecution  of  the  common

object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section 149 if it can be  held

that the offence was such as the members knew was likely  to  be  committed.

The expression ‘know’ does not mean a mere possibility,  such  as  might  or

might not happen. For instance, it is a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that

when in a village a body of heavily armed men set out to  take  a  woman  by

force, someone is likely to be killed and all the members  of  the  unlawful

assembly must be aware of that likelihood and  would  be  guilty  under  the

second part of Section 149. Similarly, if a body  of  persons  go  armed  to

take forcible possession of the land, it would be equally right to say  that

they  have  the  knowledge  that  murder  is  likely  to  committed  if  the

circumstances as to the weapons carried and other conduct of the members  of

the unlawful assembly clearly point to such knowledge on the  part  of  them

all. There is a great deal to be  said  for  the  opinion  of  Couch,  C.J.,

in Sabid Ali case [ (1873) 20 WR 5 Cr] that when an offence is committed  in

prosecution of the common object, it would generally  be  an  offence  which

the members of the unlawful assembly knew was  likely  to  be  committed  in

prosecution of the common object. That, however, does not make the  converse

proposition true; there may be cases which  would  come  within  the  second

part, but not within the first. The distinction between  the  two  parts  of

Section 149, Indian Penal Code cannot be ignored or  obliterated.  In  every

case it would be an issue to be determined  whether  the  offence  committed

falls within the first part of Section 149 as explained above or it  was  an

offence such as the members  of  the  assembly  knew  to  be  likely  to  be

committed in prosecution of the common object and falls  within  the  second

part.”

Mizaji’s case was referred to and relied upon in a long  line  of  decisions

of this  court.  (See,  e.g.,  Avtar  Singh  v.  State  of  Haryana[3],  Roy

Fernandes v. State of Goa[4], Lokeman Shah v. State of W.B.[5])

Applying the well settled principles laid down by this court we  proceed  to

examine whether the Accused can be convicted for an  offence  under  section

302 with the aid of Section 149 IPC. As per Section 141 IPC an  assembly  of

five or more persons is  designated  an  unlawful  assembly  if  the  common

object of the persons composing  that  assembly  is  to  commit  an  offence

mentioned  therein.  Guidance  is  supplied  by  this  Court  regarding  the

requirement of examining the circumstances in which the  incident  occurred,

the weapons used and the conduct of the accused during  the  course  of  the

incident. In Lalaji v State of Uttar Pradesh[6] this court held that:

“The common object  of  the  assembly  must  be  one  of  the  five  objects

mentioned in Section 141 IPC. Common object of the unlawful assembly can  be

gathered from the nature  of  the  assembly,  arms  used  by  them  and  the

behaviour of the assembly at  or  before  scene  of  occurrence.  It  is  an

inference to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of each case.”

There is no dispute about the occurrence of the incident near the  house  of

the Appellant at 06:00PM on 24.03.98. The oral testimonies of  PW1  to  PW6,

who were injured witnesses are consistent. The manner in which the  incident

occurred, the weapons used by the Accused and the  nature  of  the  injuries

caused by the accused were stated clearly therein. The  Doctor  who  treated

the injured were examined and they  have  proved  the  medical  certificates

issued by them. The doctors who  treated  the  deceased  Unadbhai  Desurbhai

were produced before the court to speak about the cause of death.  PW14  who

conducted the Post Mortem  on  the  body  of  Unadbhai  Desurbhai  was  also

examined. The situs of the incident is admitted to be near the house of  the

Appellant.  There  is  no  denial  of  the  incident  by  the  Accused.  The

submission of Mr. Raval is that the complainant along with  others  attacked

the Accused and in the resultant free fight, persons from  both  sides  were

injured. On  a  careful  examination  of  the  totality  of  the  facts  and

circumstances of the case, it is  clear  that  Accused  formed  an  unlawful

assembly. Armed with weapons like axe, iron pipes and spear, they  proceeded

to attack the Appellant who rebuked the first  Respondent  in  the  morning.

After reaching the spot of the incident, they  attacked  the  Appellant  and

caused injuries to others who came to  his  rescue.  The  common  object  to

commit an offence can be inferred from the  weapons  used  and  the  violent

manner of the attack. Having held that the Accused formed into  an  unlawful

assembly to commit an offence, what remains to be decided  is  whether  they

can be attributed with the knowledge about murder.  One of  the  members  of

the unlawful assembly Lakshmanbhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-10) was  convicted  and

sentenced  under  section  302  for  committing  the  murder   of   Unadbhai

Desurbhai. The question is whether there was a  prior  concert  by  all  the

members of the unlawful  assembly  to  commit  an  offence  of  murder.  The

background in which the attack was made by the Accused does  not  show  that

there was a common object of a murder amongst  the  accused.   Accused  No.1

was infuriated on being questioned by the Appellant regarding the damage  to

the electric pole near his house. Accused No.1 along with the other  accused

intended to show their superiority and teach  a  lesson  to  the  Appellant.

There is nothing on record  to  suggest  any  previous  enmity  between  the

parties.  Common object to commit a murder cannot be inferred  only  on  the

basis that the weapons carried by the accused  were  dangerous.   The  above

facts would indicate that no knowledge about the likelihood  of  an  offence

of murder being committed can be attributed to the members of  the  unlawful

assembly, barring Lakshmanbhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-10) who has been  convicted

under Section 302 IPC.

Though the accused cannot be convicted under section 302 with the aid of  S.

149 IPC in view of the above findings, they would  still  be  liable  for  a

lesser punishment. The common object of the unlawful assembly to attack  the

Appellant and others is proved. Considering the manner  of  the  attack  and

the deadly weapons used, we are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  Accused

Valerbhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-1), Unadbhai  Deganbhai  Vagh  (A-2),  Bhimabhai

Deganbhai Vagh (A-3), Unadbhai Bhagabhai Vagh (A-5),  Bhagwanbhai  Bhikabhai

Vagh (A-7), Bhikabhai Jinabhai Vagh (A-8),  Hasurbhai  Bhikhabhai  Vagh  (A-

11), Bhanabhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-12), Patabhai @ Aatabhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-

13) and Bhavabhai Jikarbhai Vagh (A-14) are guilty of offence under  Section

326 read with 149 IPC.  We  are  informed  that  the  accused  have  already

undergone a sentence of seven and a half years. Considering  the  fact  that

the incident occurred in the year 1998 and that there is no  complaint  from

either side about  any  further  violence  since  then  we  opine  that  the

sentence can be limited to the period undergone.

It is no more res integra that a finding of the commission  of  the  offence

under Section 326 read with Section 149 can be recorded against  members  of

an unlawful assembly even if  it  is  established  that  the  offence  under

Section 302 was committed by one member of  such  assembly.   (See:  Shambhu

Nath Singh and Ors v. State of Bihar[7])

The High Court found that the conviction of the accused  under  section  302

read with 149 IPC  cannot  be  upheld  as  there  was  neither  an  unlawful

assembly nor a common object  to  cause  death.  The  High  Court  miserably

failed to consider the facts and circumstances of the case before coming  to

such conclusion. Section  149  IPC  does  not  become  inapplicable  in  all

situations where there is a cross case  by  the  accused.   The  High  Court

ought to have taken note of the acquittal of the  Appellant  and  others  in

the said cross case on 24.06.2003.  The  judgment  of  the  High  Court  was

delivered on 29.07.2009 by which  date  there  was  no  cross  case  pending

against  the  Appellants.   Recording  a  finding   of   acquittal   without

reappreciation of evidence by the Appellate Court would result  in  flagrant

miscarriage of justice and that is exactly what happened in this case.

The Appeal is partly allowed and the Accused Valerbhai  Deganbhai  Vagh  (A-

1), Unadbhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-2), Bhimabhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-3),  Unadbhai

Bhagabhai Vagh (A-5), Bhagwanbhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-7),  Bhikabhai  Jinabhai

Vagh (A-8), Hasurbhai Bhikhabhai Vagh(A-11), Bhanabhai  Bhikabhai  Vagh  (A-

12), Patabhai @ Aatabhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-13) and Bhavabhai Jikarbhai  Vagh

(A-14) are convicted under section 326 read with 149 IPC  and  sentenced  to

the period undergone.

………………………………….J

[S. A. BOBDE]

..………………………………..J

[L. NAGESWARA RAO]

New Delhi,

February 01, 2017

———————–

[1]

[2] (1873) 20 W.R. 5 Cr. | (1873) 11 Beng. L.R. 347 (FB).

[3]

[4]1959 (1) SCR 940 at p. 946-949.

[5]

[6] (2012) 9 SCC 432 at ¶ 27 and 28.

[7]

[8] (2012) 3 SCC 221 at ¶ 31 and 32.

[9]

[10] (2001) 5 SCC 235 at ¶ 20 and 21.

[11]

[12] (1989) 1 SCC 437 at ¶ 8

[13]

[14] AIR 1960 SC 725 | 1960 Cri LJ 144 at ¶ 6 and 7

———————–

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