whether a post-acquisition allottee of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act). If not, whether the impugned order permitting additional evidence and directing remand is sustainable.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 1587-1636 OF 2017 SATISH KUMAR GUPTA ETC. … Continue reading whether a post-acquisition allottee of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act). If not, whether the impugned order permitting additional evidence and directing remand is sustainable.

When the Court is called upon to interpret the documents and examine its effect, it involves questions of law. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide such questions on merits. = whether the suit property is self-acquired property of late Sk. Noor Mohammad and, if so, whether respondent No.1 was entitled to inherit the same as his legal representative in accordance with the shares defined in the Mohammedan Law and secondly, whether the suit property is self-acquired property of the appellant (defendant No.1) on the strength of documents filed by him and, if so, whether it has resulted in excluding respondent No.1 to claim any share in such property as an heir of Sk. Noor Mohammad, was required to be decided by framing substantial questions of law in the light of proved documents filed by defendant No.1 because it was his case that the suit property was his self-acquired property. The High Court unfortunately did not examine any document for deciding the ownership issue in relation to the suit property.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.  3048  OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP … Continue reading When the Court is called upon to interpret the documents and examine its effect, it involves questions of law. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide such questions on merits. = whether the suit property is self-acquired property of late Sk. Noor Mohammad and, if so, whether respondent No.1 was entitled to inherit the same as his legal representative in accordance with the shares defined in the Mohammedan Law and secondly, whether the suit property is self-acquired property of the appellant (defendant No.1) on the strength of documents filed by him and, if so, whether it has resulted in excluding respondent No.1 to claim any share in such property as an heir of Sk. Noor Mohammad, was required to be decided by framing substantial questions of law in the light of proved documents filed by defendant No.1 because it was his case that the suit property was his self-acquired property. The High Court unfortunately did not examine any document for deciding the ownership issue in relation to the suit property.

executability of decree for permanent injunction against the legal representatives of judgment- debtor. = Resultantly, we allow the appeals, set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and hold that the direction issued by the executing court that an undertaking be furnished by the legal representatives to abide by the decree is proper, failing which the executing court would proceed in a permissible mode in accordance with law to enforce the decree under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32 CPC.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3007-3008  OF 2017 [Arising out of SLP … Continue reading executability of decree for permanent injunction against the legal representatives of judgment- debtor. = Resultantly, we allow the appeals, set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and hold that the direction issued by the executing court that an undertaking be furnished by the legal representatives to abide by the decree is proper, failing which the executing court would proceed in a permissible mode in accordance with law to enforce the decree under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32 CPC.

The case of the applicant is that they are carrying on business in manufacture and sale of salt since the year 1976 in the name and style as “AKAR Enterprises”. The trade mark “AKAR” with a particular artistic work, 2 design and get up and fonts for marketing of salt adopted by the applicant and has become distinctive on the ground of long and continuous use and acquired reputation and goodwill. The applicant had obtained the registration of the trade mark “AKAR” under No.556425 and 556426 in class 30. =there is enormous delay of 10 years in filing their present application in spite of knowing very well that the first respondent is continuously using the impugned trade mark “AKASH” right from the year 1999 and even as per their admission to the effect that they came to know about it from 14/03/2009 but they have not raised their little finger to file the present application and to take any action. It is seen that even the Civil Suit was filed only in the year 2009 in OS No.4431/2009 on the file of Additional City Civil Court, Bengaluru and the present application is filed only after nine years. It is pertinent to note that both the applicant and first respondent are having their business place in Bengaluru and also in the same area at New Tharagupet and such being the position it is unimaginable to state that the applicant came to know the use of impugned trade mark only in the year 2009. Considering all these aspects we are of the firm view that the first respondent is entitled to invoke the provision under section 33 in respect of the effect of acquiescence though the learned counsel for the applicant took pain to contend the present facts would not make out the case of acquiescence. In view of the above said reasons we are unable to countenance such contention. In view of the aforesaid reasons the ORA/82/2014/TM/CH is hereby dismissed.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex, Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai – 600 018  ORA/82/2014/TM/CH TUESDAY … Continue reading The case of the applicant is that they are carrying on business in manufacture and sale of salt since the year 1976 in the name and style as “AKAR Enterprises”. The trade mark “AKAR” with a particular artistic work, 2 design and get up and fonts for marketing of salt adopted by the applicant and has become distinctive on the ground of long and continuous use and acquired reputation and goodwill. The applicant had obtained the registration of the trade mark “AKAR” under No.556425 and 556426 in class 30. =there is enormous delay of 10 years in filing their present application in spite of knowing very well that the first respondent is continuously using the impugned trade mark “AKASH” right from the year 1999 and even as per their admission to the effect that they came to know about it from 14/03/2009 but they have not raised their little finger to file the present application and to take any action. It is seen that even the Civil Suit was filed only in the year 2009 in OS No.4431/2009 on the file of Additional City Civil Court, Bengaluru and the present application is filed only after nine years. It is pertinent to note that both the applicant and first respondent are having their business place in Bengaluru and also in the same area at New Tharagupet and such being the position it is unimaginable to state that the applicant came to know the use of impugned trade mark only in the year 2009. Considering all these aspects we are of the firm view that the first respondent is entitled to invoke the provision under section 33 in respect of the effect of acquiescence though the learned counsel for the applicant took pain to contend the present facts would not make out the case of acquiescence. In view of the above said reasons we are unable to countenance such contention. In view of the aforesaid reasons the ORA/82/2014/TM/CH is hereby dismissed.

“Revocation of the patent is sought on the grounds of lack of novelty, obviousness and insufficiency. The patentees have not filed a Counterstatement, and by their Agenmts’ letter dated 5 March 1981 indicated that they do not intend to contest the application and furthermore propose to allow the patent to lapse by non-payment of the renewal fee due on 27 July, 1981. Subsequently, the patentees have formally offered to surrender their patent, and no opposition to the surrender has been entered. Under the provisions of Section 29 of the Patents Act, 1977, the acceptance by the Comproller of an offer to surrender a patent does not result in the automatic termination of any revocation proceedings that may be in being, although it is clear that the rights existing prior to the date of acceptance of the offer are considerably impaired by the surrender. In the present case, it is manifest that the revocation is to be treated as undefended and accordingly, in dealing with the issues raised, I must assume that the truth of every statement made by the applicants in their statement of cases has been conceded, unless it is contradicted by facts elsewhere in the documents filed. Having reviewed the matter, I am satisfied that the applicants’ case at least in respect of prior publication and obviousness is of undoubted substance, and since in the circumstances the question of amendment does not arise, I therefore direct that the patent be revoked. It follows that no further action is necessary in relation to the offer to surrender the patent.” -Consequently the Controller of Patents, Patent Office, Chennai is directed to remove the impugned patent standing in the name of the first respondent “ICOS Corporation” under patent No.224314 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the order copy of this Bench. Consequently the surrender proceedings pending before the Controller of Patents becomes infructuous

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex, Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai – 600 018 ORA/31/2015/PT/CH FRIDAY THIS … Continue reading “Revocation of the patent is sought on the grounds of lack of novelty, obviousness and insufficiency. The patentees have not filed a Counterstatement, and by their Agenmts’ letter dated 5 March 1981 indicated that they do not intend to contest the application and furthermore propose to allow the patent to lapse by non-payment of the renewal fee due on 27 July, 1981. Subsequently, the patentees have formally offered to surrender their patent, and no opposition to the surrender has been entered. Under the provisions of Section 29 of the Patents Act, 1977, the acceptance by the Comproller of an offer to surrender a patent does not result in the automatic termination of any revocation proceedings that may be in being, although it is clear that the rights existing prior to the date of acceptance of the offer are considerably impaired by the surrender. In the present case, it is manifest that the revocation is to be treated as undefended and accordingly, in dealing with the issues raised, I must assume that the truth of every statement made by the applicants in their statement of cases has been conceded, unless it is contradicted by facts elsewhere in the documents filed. Having reviewed the matter, I am satisfied that the applicants’ case at least in respect of prior publication and obviousness is of undoubted substance, and since in the circumstances the question of amendment does not arise, I therefore direct that the patent be revoked. It follows that no further action is necessary in relation to the offer to surrender the patent.” -Consequently the Controller of Patents, Patent Office, Chennai is directed to remove the impugned patent standing in the name of the first respondent “ICOS Corporation” under patent No.224314 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the order copy of this Bench. Consequently the surrender proceedings pending before the Controller of Patents becomes infructuous

Right of Private Defence = there is substance in the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants regarding the right to private defence for the following reasons: It is recorded in the judgment of the High Court that the Public Prosecutor argued that the deceased was beaten outside the house which was corroborated by the site plan. The Investigating Officer stated in his evidence that there was a cross case lodged by Lal Chand in which a charge-sheet under Section 323, 324, 326 and 34 IPC was filed against Bahadur Mal and Vijay Singh @ Vijendra. The injury reports of the accused persons Exh.D-18, D-19 and D-21 were filed. Suggestions were made to prosecution witnesses Gita, Ram Chandra, Patasi and Bihari about the complainant party being aggressors. 7. In view of the above facts and circumstances, we hold that the conviction of the Appellants under Section 302 is unsustainable. However, we are convinced that the accused are guilty of causing the death of Virendra and they are liable for conviction for an offence punishable under Section 304 Part-I IPC. As we are informed that the Appellants have served a sentence of nearly 11 ½ years, we sentence them to the period already undergone. They may be set free, if they are not required in any other case

Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.483 of 2013 JAGMAL & ORS. …. Appellant(s) … Continue reading Right of Private Defence = there is substance in the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants regarding the right to private defence for the following reasons: It is recorded in the judgment of the High Court that the Public Prosecutor argued that the deceased was beaten outside the house which was corroborated by the site plan. The Investigating Officer stated in his evidence that there was a cross case lodged by Lal Chand in which a charge-sheet under Section 323, 324, 326 and 34 IPC was filed against Bahadur Mal and Vijay Singh @ Vijendra. The injury reports of the accused persons Exh.D-18, D-19 and D-21 were filed. Suggestions were made to prosecution witnesses Gita, Ram Chandra, Patasi and Bihari about the complainant party being aggressors. 7. In view of the above facts and circumstances, we hold that the conviction of the Appellants under Section 302 is unsustainable. However, we are convinced that the accused are guilty of causing the death of Virendra and they are liable for conviction for an offence punishable under Section 304 Part-I IPC. As we are informed that the Appellants have served a sentence of nearly 11 ½ years, we sentence them to the period already undergone. They may be set free, if they are not required in any other case

Child Custody – whether she could shift to India, even temporarily for a year or so, as in that eventuality, the Court can consider giving custody of Vaishali to her for that period. However, she expressed her inability to do so. She wants custody of Vaishali on her own terms. She wants Vaishali to come to U.K. and live with her. Vaishali does not want to go to U.K. at all. This Court cannot take the risk of sending Vaishali to a foreign country, against the wishes of a mature girl like Vaishali, as it may prove to be a turbulent and tormenting experience for her. That would not be in her interest. We also had interaction with Vaishali in the Chambers earlier. On the date of hearing also, Vaishali was present in the Court and in front of her parents, she unequivocally expressed that she was happy with her father and wanted to continue in his company and did not want to go with her mother, much less to U.K. From the interaction, it is clearly discernible that she is a mature girl who is in a position to weigh the pros and cons of two alternatives and to decide as to which course of action is more suited to her. She has developed her personality and formed her opinion after considering all the attendant circumstances. Her intellectual characteristics are adequately developed. She is able to solve problems, think about her future and understands the long term effects of the decision which she has taken. We also find that she has been brought up in a conducive atmosphere. It, thus, becomes apparent that in the instant case, we are dealing with the custody of a child who is 15 years of age and has achieved sufficient level of maturity. Further, in spite of giving ample chances to the respondent by giving temporary custody of Vaishali to her, respondent has not been able to win over the confidence of Vaishali. We, therefore, feel that her welfare lies in the continued company of her father which appears to be in her best interest. The High Court in the impugned judgment had stated that since Vaishali was a minor girl, she needed company of her mother more to understand girly things. The High Court mentioned about the bond between girl child and mother in abstract and from there only the High Court came to the conclusion that it would be better to give the custody to the mother. The High Court did not go into the specific situation and circumstances of this case and did not make any objective assessment about the welfare of Vaishali. Many circumstances which we have narrated above were not taken note of. On the facts of the present case, we are convinced that custody of the child needs to be with father. She is already 15 years of age and within 3 years, she would be major and all this custody battle between her parents would come to an end. She would have complete freedom to decide the course of action she would like to adopt in her life. We, thus, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court.

  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 717 OF 2013 |JITENDER ARORA & … Continue reading Child Custody – whether she could shift to India, even temporarily for a year or so, as in that eventuality, the Court can consider giving custody of Vaishali to her for that period. However, she expressed her inability to do so. She wants custody of Vaishali on her own terms. She wants Vaishali to come to U.K. and live with her. Vaishali does not want to go to U.K. at all. This Court cannot take the risk of sending Vaishali to a foreign country, against the wishes of a mature girl like Vaishali, as it may prove to be a turbulent and tormenting experience for her. That would not be in her interest. We also had interaction with Vaishali in the Chambers earlier. On the date of hearing also, Vaishali was present in the Court and in front of her parents, she unequivocally expressed that she was happy with her father and wanted to continue in his company and did not want to go with her mother, much less to U.K. From the interaction, it is clearly discernible that she is a mature girl who is in a position to weigh the pros and cons of two alternatives and to decide as to which course of action is more suited to her. She has developed her personality and formed her opinion after considering all the attendant circumstances. Her intellectual characteristics are adequately developed. She is able to solve problems, think about her future and understands the long term effects of the decision which she has taken. We also find that she has been brought up in a conducive atmosphere. It, thus, becomes apparent that in the instant case, we are dealing with the custody of a child who is 15 years of age and has achieved sufficient level of maturity. Further, in spite of giving ample chances to the respondent by giving temporary custody of Vaishali to her, respondent has not been able to win over the confidence of Vaishali. We, therefore, feel that her welfare lies in the continued company of her father which appears to be in her best interest. The High Court in the impugned judgment had stated that since Vaishali was a minor girl, she needed company of her mother more to understand girly things. The High Court mentioned about the bond between girl child and mother in abstract and from there only the High Court came to the conclusion that it would be better to give the custody to the mother. The High Court did not go into the specific situation and circumstances of this case and did not make any objective assessment about the welfare of Vaishali. Many circumstances which we have narrated above were not taken note of. On the facts of the present case, we are convinced that custody of the child needs to be with father. She is already 15 years of age and within 3 years, she would be major and all this custody battle between her parents would come to an end. She would have complete freedom to decide the course of action she would like to adopt in her life. We, thus, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court.