Monthly Archives: October 2016
surcharge has been levied under Section 5A of the said Act on the gross sales tax payable, without deducting the entry tax as required under Section 4 of the OET Act.= It is well settled that the objective of framing rules is to fill up the gaps in a statutory enactment so as to make the statutory provisions operative. Rules also clarify the provisions of an Act under which the same are framed. Section 4 of the OST Act is a charging Section attracting liability to pay Sales Tax “on sales and purchases effected”. Section 5 of the OST Act provides for rate of Sales Tax. Section 5A of the OST Act levies surcharge on the dealer which is nothing but an additional tax. Therefore, on a plain reading of the provisions under the OST Act as well as under the OET Act, a dealer is not entitled for reduction of the amount of entry tax from the amount of tax payable before the levy of surcharge under Section 5A of the OST Act. A harmonious reading of Rule 18 of the Rules as well as Sections 4, 5, 5-A of the OST Act reveals no conflict or inconsistency. The Rules are to be construed to have been made for furtherance of the cause for which the Statute is enacted and not for the purpose of bringing inconsistencies. 21) Section 5A of the OST Act is a self-contained provision and the surcharge, as already seen above, is leviable at the specified per centum of tax payable under the OST Act. Tax payable under the OST Act is independent of the provisions of OET Act. The assessment or quantification or computation of surcharge shall have to be made in accordance with the provisions of the OST Act. 22) Thus, on a conjoint reading of Section 5 of the OST Act, Section 4 of the OET Act and Rule 18 of the Rules, we are of the considered opinion that the amount of surcharge under Section 5A of the OST Act is to be levied before deducting the amount of entry tax paid by a dealer. 23) In view of the forgoing discussion, the impugned judgment and order dated 05.01.2007 passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. In the result, all the appeals are allowed; however, the parties shall bear their own cost.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5913-5920 OF 2008 Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors. …. Appellant(s) Versus M/s Bajaj Auto Ltd. & Anr. …. Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5921 OF … Continue reading
“Indirect Taxation”=Section 3-B undoubtedly commences with a non-obstante clause, but the provision has to be read harmoniously with sub-section (6) to Section 4-B. Any other interpretation would make sub-section (6) a dead letter, for if we accept the plea of the Revenue whenever there is violation or failure to abide with the “intendment”, Section 3-B would be invoked and applied, not sub-section(6) to Section 4-B. Section 3-B would apply when a false and wrong certificate or declaration is made. Sub-section (6) on the other hand, deals with cases where the dealer is unable to comply with the intendment, i.e., for some reason he is unable to sell the goods within the State, export them or sell them in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Intendment of the said nature has not been treated as false or wrong declaration as consequences have been prescribed in sub-section (6). It is essential to be stated that consistency and certainty in tax matters is necessary. In cases relating to “Indirect Taxation”, this principle is even more important. Clarity in this regard is a necessity and the interpretative vision should be same.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10430 OF 2016 (@ S.L.P. (Civil) No. 28962 of 2013) Commissioner of Commercial Tax, U.P. …Appellant Versus M/s Oswal Greentech Limited …Respondent J U D G M … Continue reading
in Benson vs. State of Kerala – Criminal Appeal No.958 of 2016 (since disposed of on 03.10.2016) and the accompanying appeals, arising from the conviction of the appellant from his prosecution on the offences proved, this Court in the singular facts as involved and having regard to the duration of his incarceration and the remission earned by him, extended the benefit of such discretion and directed that the sentences awarded to him in those cases would run concurrently. It was noticeably recorded that the offences in the cases under scrutiny had been committed on the same day. The benefit of the discretion was accorded to the appellant therein referring as well to the observation in V.K. Bansal (supra) that it is difficult to lay down any straight jacket approach in the matter and that a direction that the subsequent sentence would run concurrently or not, would essentially depend on the nature of the offence or offences and the overall fact situation. Understandably, the appellant was required to serve the default sentence as awarded with the direction that if the fine imposed had not been deposited, the default sentence or sentences would run consecutively.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 988-989 OF 2016 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRL.) NOS.6226-27 OF 2016) SHYAM PAL .…APPELLANT VERSUS DAYAWATI BESOYA & ANR. ….RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N … Continue reading
This Court in Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi, 2001 (8) SCC 233 at page 244 upheld the decision of a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court wherein it was decided that the jurisdiction of the High Court to try an election petition is not by way of constituting a special jurisdiction and conferring it upon the High Court. It is an extension of the original jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and decide the election disputes. It is clear from the above judgments of this Court that the inherent power of the High Court is not taken away when the election disputes are adjudicated. Section 53 (2) is a power conferred on the Returning Officer to declare a candidate elected when the number of candidates is equal to the number of seats to be filled. The power of the High Court is not fettered by Section 53 (2). The High Court has taken into consideration an anomalous situation that would arise by a candidate belonging to one party being declared elected after having crossed the floor. We are in agreement with the High Court and we do not intend to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2649 of 2016 SRI MAIREMBAM PRITHVIRAJ @ PRITHVIRAJ SINGH …. Appellant(s) Versus SHRI PUKHREM SHARATCHANDRA SINGH ….Respondent(s) With CIVIL APPEAL No. 2829 of 2016 PUKHREM SHARATCHANDRA SINGH … Continue reading
in Pradeep Sharma vs. Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Dev. Authority & Anr. in Civil Appeal Nos.52- 53 of 2016 in almost identical circumstances directed the continuance of allotment made in favour of allottee subject to his paying the prevalent HUDA rate for the plot of land upon which he had constructed a house in Sector 64 of Faridabad in almost similar circumstances and in connivance with HUDA officials. It is true that the appellant has been a beneficiary of what is and can be said to be a fraudulent allotment yet keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case demolition of the house and restoration of the plot to HUDA may at this stage work rather harshly for him/them. The proper course, therefore, is to allow the allotment to continue subject to the appellant depositing the prevalent price of the plot at the rate of Rs.18,000/- per square meter as indicated above.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10418-10419 OF 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P (C) Nos.30067-30068 of 2013) Pratap Singh Yadav …Appellant Versus Haryana Urban Development Authority & Anr. …Respondents J U D G … Continue reading
There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (- at the lowest grade, in the regular pay- scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same post.
“REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 213 OF 2013 State of Punjab & Ors. … Appellants Versus Jagjit Singh & Ors. … Respondents WITH |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10356 OF 2016 |CIVIL APPEAL NO. … Continue reading
The objective of Sec 5(2) of KGST Act is to assess the sale of branded goods by the brand name holder to the market and the inter se sale between the brand name holders is not intended to be covered by Sec. 5(2) of the KGST Act.= if the sale between the holding company and the subsidiary company, both having the right to use the same brand name, is at realistic price and the marketing company namely, the appellant-Company charged only usual margins in the trade, then there is no scope for ignoring the first sale, particularly, when the first seller was also the holder of the brand name and was free to market the products in the brand name. However, the evidence on record shows that the margin charged by the appellant-Company while making the further sale of product is unusually high. So the inter se sale between the groups of companies under the control of the same family was only to reduce tax liability and was rightly ignored by the assessing officer by levying tax under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act.- tax invoking Section 5(2) of the KGST Act was rightly levied on the appellant-Company for the relevant period as it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant-Company is the brand name holder of “Sansui”.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4283-4284 OF 2013 KAIL Ltd. (Formerly Kitchen Appliances India Ltd.) …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Kerala Represented thrgh. Jt. Commr. (Law) …. Respondent(s) J U D G … Continue reading