These are cases where the courts which tried the suits were ordinary civil court having jurisdiction to grant alternative relief and pass decree under Order VII Rule 7. A court of Rent Controller having limited jurisdiction to try suits on grounds specified in the special Act obviously does not have jurisdiction of the ordinary civil court and therefore cannot pass a decree for eviction of the defendant on a ground other than the one specified in the Act. If, however, the alternative relief is permissible within the ambit of the Act, the position would be different.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 3406 of 1998 PETITIONER: RAJENDRA TIWARY Vs. RESPONDENT: BASUDEO PRASAD & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/11/2001 … Continue reading These are cases where the courts which tried the suits were ordinary civil court having jurisdiction to grant alternative relief and pass decree under Order VII Rule 7. A court of Rent Controller having limited jurisdiction to try suits on grounds specified in the special Act obviously does not have jurisdiction of the ordinary civil court and therefore cannot pass a decree for eviction of the defendant on a ground other than the one specified in the Act. If, however, the alternative relief is permissible within the ambit of the Act, the position would be different.

Vodafone had failed to comply with its obligation under the Interconnect Agreement and had routed international calls as national calls making it liable to pay damages for the loss suffered by BSNL= the core of which, insofar as BSNL is concerned, is that Tata Teleservices Limited having taken the benefit of the Circular dated 13.06.2005, (made effective from 01.05.2003) for the latter part of the period involved, its liability would accrue from the said date and the demand has been worked out on the basis that 48.9% of the calls are non-CLI calls and therefore Clause 6.4.6 would apply. It is urged that the contention of the Tata Teleservices Limited that the calls are less than 0.5% is plainly incorrect. 29. In reply, it is urged that Clause 6.4.6 of the Interconnect agreement, in the form and content in which it has been applied to the case of the respondent, was introduced by the addendum dated 01.12.2005, effective from 14.11.2003. In the present case, the alleged violation of Clause 6.4.6 is on the ground of transmitting calls without CLI. It is urged that upto the date on which Clause 6.4.6 came into operation i.e. 14.11.2003, the demand raised on the said basis is without any authority. It is further submitted that the receipt of calls without CLI having been disapproved/rejected by the TRAI and there being express directions requiring BSNL to reject such calls, the appellant cannot take advantage of its own action contrary to the directions of the Regulator i.e. TRAI. Furthermore, according to the respondent, the Circular dated 13.06.2005 prohibits BSNL to mechanically apply Clause 6.4.6 and it is only upon elimination of technical failures, incompatibility between exchanges, etc. that Clause 6.4.6 can be resorted to and that too for the period after 14.11.2003. it is the case of the appellant BSNL itself that non-CLI calls transmitted by the Tata Teleservices Limited to the BSNL network was more than 0.5% and hence Clause 6.4.6 of the Interconnect agreement would be applicable, ex facie, the demand raised for the period from May 2003 to November 2003 would be without any legal authority inasmuch as Clause 6.4.6 became a part of the Interconnect agreement between the parties with retrospective effect from 14.11.2003.In view of the aforesaid finding recorded by the learned Tribunal with which this Court is in full agreement, it will not be necessary to go into any other issue so far as the demand for the said period is concerned. For the remaining period i.e. November, 2003 to May 2004 during which period Clause 6.4.6 was in force, the finding of the learned Tribunal that Tata Teleservices Limited should be given an opportunity and the quantum of loss suffered by B.S.N.L. should be computed accordingly would, however, require a close look. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. Reliance Communication Limited (supra), this Court has held that Clause 6.4.6 prescribes a pre-estimate of reasonable compensation. The premise on which the learned Tribunal had held the necessity of affording an opportunity to Tata Teleservices Limited for determination of the quantum of loss suffered by BSNL for the period from November 2003 to May 2004 proceeded on the basis that Clause 6.4.6 is a penal clause As the said basis stands altered by the decision of this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Reliance Communication Limited (supra), computation of liability for the period from November 2003 to May 2004, during which period Clause 6.4.6 was in operation, must necessarily be made in accordance with the terms of the said clause. The order of the learned Tribunal, therefore, to the aforesaid extent, is set aside and the appeal is partly allowed. The demand raised for the period from May 2003 to November 2003, as held earlier, shall stand set aside while for the period from 14.11.2003 to May, 2004 shall be determined in accordance with Clause 6.4.6 of the Agreement as brought into effect with retrospective effect from 14.11.2003.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8107 OF 2010 Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited … Continue reading Vodafone had failed to comply with its obligation under the Interconnect Agreement and had routed international calls as national calls making it liable to pay damages for the loss suffered by BSNL= the core of which, insofar as BSNL is concerned, is that Tata Teleservices Limited having taken the benefit of the Circular dated 13.06.2005, (made effective from 01.05.2003) for the latter part of the period involved, its liability would accrue from the said date and the demand has been worked out on the basis that 48.9% of the calls are non-CLI calls and therefore Clause 6.4.6 would apply. It is urged that the contention of the Tata Teleservices Limited that the calls are less than 0.5% is plainly incorrect. 29. In reply, it is urged that Clause 6.4.6 of the Interconnect agreement, in the form and content in which it has been applied to the case of the respondent, was introduced by the addendum dated 01.12.2005, effective from 14.11.2003. In the present case, the alleged violation of Clause 6.4.6 is on the ground of transmitting calls without CLI. It is urged that upto the date on which Clause 6.4.6 came into operation i.e. 14.11.2003, the demand raised on the said basis is without any authority. It is further submitted that the receipt of calls without CLI having been disapproved/rejected by the TRAI and there being express directions requiring BSNL to reject such calls, the appellant cannot take advantage of its own action contrary to the directions of the Regulator i.e. TRAI. Furthermore, according to the respondent, the Circular dated 13.06.2005 prohibits BSNL to mechanically apply Clause 6.4.6 and it is only upon elimination of technical failures, incompatibility between exchanges, etc. that Clause 6.4.6 can be resorted to and that too for the period after 14.11.2003. it is the case of the appellant BSNL itself that non-CLI calls transmitted by the Tata Teleservices Limited to the BSNL network was more than 0.5% and hence Clause 6.4.6 of the Interconnect agreement would be applicable, ex facie, the demand raised for the period from May 2003 to November 2003 would be without any legal authority inasmuch as Clause 6.4.6 became a part of the Interconnect agreement between the parties with retrospective effect from 14.11.2003.In view of the aforesaid finding recorded by the learned Tribunal with which this Court is in full agreement, it will not be necessary to go into any other issue so far as the demand for the said period is concerned. For the remaining period i.e. November, 2003 to May 2004 during which period Clause 6.4.6 was in force, the finding of the learned Tribunal that Tata Teleservices Limited should be given an opportunity and the quantum of loss suffered by B.S.N.L. should be computed accordingly would, however, require a close look. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. Reliance Communication Limited (supra), this Court has held that Clause 6.4.6 prescribes a pre-estimate of reasonable compensation. The premise on which the learned Tribunal had held the necessity of affording an opportunity to Tata Teleservices Limited for determination of the quantum of loss suffered by BSNL for the period from November 2003 to May 2004 proceeded on the basis that Clause 6.4.6 is a penal clause As the said basis stands altered by the decision of this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Reliance Communication Limited (supra), computation of liability for the period from November 2003 to May 2004, during which period Clause 6.4.6 was in operation, must necessarily be made in accordance with the terms of the said clause. The order of the learned Tribunal, therefore, to the aforesaid extent, is set aside and the appeal is partly allowed. The demand raised for the period from May 2003 to November 2003, as held earlier, shall stand set aside while for the period from 14.11.2003 to May, 2004 shall be determined in accordance with Clause 6.4.6 of the Agreement as brought into effect with retrospective effect from 14.11.2003.

“Whether the 35 persons whose names are shown in the Annexure and who were employed by M/s. Triveni Engineering Works, a Contractor at Dugda Coal Washery are to be treated as workmen of M/s BCCL and whether the demand of the Coal Washeries Workers Union that these persons be regularized/absorbed in the services of M/s. BCCL is justified? If so, to what relief are these persons entitled?” = the Division Bench was right in observing that, in the facts of the present case, an order of reinstatement must be eschewed, being inequitable. The workmen, however, must be compensated in lieu of reinstatement. Applying the principle underlying the decisions of this Court in Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. P.P. Chopra[1] and the recent case of Delhi International Airport (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India[2], in our considered opinion, interest of justice would be met by enhancing the amount of compensation in lieu of reinstatement/absorption and regularisation quantified at Rs.1,50,000/-(Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand) to each workmen. For, the workmen have already received wages from October 2004 to January 2012 in terms of the order under Section 17(B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 without any work assigned to them. The respondent paid minimum wages to the concerned workmen during the relevant period as the workmen were not able to produce any document in support of their last drawn wages. This lump sum compensation amount of Rs.1,50,000/- to each workmen would be in full and final settlement of all the claims of the concerned workmen and substitute the order passed by the Tribunal to that extent, without any further enquiry as to whether the concerned workmen was gainfully employed during the relevant period or not.The respondent shall deposit the amount payable in terms of this order to the workmen before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, within three months from today. Failing which, shall be liable to pay interest thereon at the rate of 10% p.a. from today till the amount is deposited or paid to the concerned workmen, whichever is earlier. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, shall cause to disburse the amount to the concerned workmen subject to verification.

(Non-Reportable) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9278 OF 2014 The General Secretary, Coal … Continue reading “Whether the 35 persons whose names are shown in the Annexure and who were employed by M/s. Triveni Engineering Works, a Contractor at Dugda Coal Washery are to be treated as workmen of M/s BCCL and whether the demand of the Coal Washeries Workers Union that these persons be regularized/absorbed in the services of M/s. BCCL is justified? If so, to what relief are these persons entitled?” = the Division Bench was right in observing that, in the facts of the present case, an order of reinstatement must be eschewed, being inequitable. The workmen, however, must be compensated in lieu of reinstatement. Applying the principle underlying the decisions of this Court in Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. P.P. Chopra[1] and the recent case of Delhi International Airport (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India[2], in our considered opinion, interest of justice would be met by enhancing the amount of compensation in lieu of reinstatement/absorption and regularisation quantified at Rs.1,50,000/-(Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand) to each workmen. For, the workmen have already received wages from October 2004 to January 2012 in terms of the order under Section 17(B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 without any work assigned to them. The respondent paid minimum wages to the concerned workmen during the relevant period as the workmen were not able to produce any document in support of their last drawn wages. This lump sum compensation amount of Rs.1,50,000/- to each workmen would be in full and final settlement of all the claims of the concerned workmen and substitute the order passed by the Tribunal to that extent, without any further enquiry as to whether the concerned workmen was gainfully employed during the relevant period or not.The respondent shall deposit the amount payable in terms of this order to the workmen before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, within three months from today. Failing which, shall be liable to pay interest thereon at the rate of 10% p.a. from today till the amount is deposited or paid to the concerned workmen, whichever is earlier. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, shall cause to disburse the amount to the concerned workmen subject to verification.

In Mobarik Ali Ahmed vs. The State of Bombay AIR 1957 SC 857, this Court has held as under:- “11…..Learned counsel objected to this approach on a question of proof. We are, however, unable to see any objection. The proof of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the document and is proof of a fact like that of any other fact. The evidence relating thereto may be direct or circumstantial. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document being written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents, or of the signature, by one of the modes provided in Sections 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may also be proved by internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document. This last mode of proof by the contents may be of considerable value where the disputed document purports to be a link in a chain of correspondence, some links in which are proved to the satisfaction of the court. In such a situation the person who is the recipient of the document, be it either a letter or a telegram, would be in a reasonably good position both with reference to his prior knowledge of the writing or the signature of the alleged sender limited though it may be, as also his knowledge of the subject matter of the chain of correspondence, to speak to its authorship. In an appropriate case the court may also be in a position to judge whether the document constitutes a genuine link in the chain of correspondence and thus to determine its authorship. We are unable, therefore, to say that the approach adopted by the courts below in arriving at the conclusion that the letters are genuine is open to any serious legal objection. The question, if any, can only be as to the adequacy of the material on which the conclusion as to the genuineness of the letters is arrived at. That however is a matter which we cannot permit to be canvassed before us.- It is thus clear that uncorroborated evidence of a hand writing expert is an extremely weak type of evidence and the same should not be relied upon either for the conviction or for acquittal. ; adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn only if it withholds certain evidence and not merely on account of its failure to obtain certain evidence.; It is not necessary that all those persons who were present at the spot must be examined by the prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused. Having examined all the witnesses, even if other persons present nearby not examined, the evidence of eye-witness cannot be discarded.; mitigating factors which are – old age of the appellant-accused, health ailments, responsibility of looking after the unmarried daughter suffering from congenital heart disease, past meritorious service and prolonged trial. Keeping in view the aforementioned factors especially the old age and physical condition of the appellant-accused, we do not think it expedient to put him back in jail. While we uphold the findings as to the guilt of the appellant-accused, we are of the opinion that the cause of justice would be best sub-served when the sentence of the appellant-accused would be altered to the period already undergone. We, therefore, reduce the sentence of the appellant to the period already undergone by him as a special case considering his very advanced age.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2126 OF 2010 S.P.S. Rathore …. … Continue reading In Mobarik Ali Ahmed vs. The State of Bombay AIR 1957 SC 857, this Court has held as under:- “11…..Learned counsel objected to this approach on a question of proof. We are, however, unable to see any objection. The proof of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the document and is proof of a fact like that of any other fact. The evidence relating thereto may be direct or circumstantial. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document being written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents, or of the signature, by one of the modes provided in Sections 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may also be proved by internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document. This last mode of proof by the contents may be of considerable value where the disputed document purports to be a link in a chain of correspondence, some links in which are proved to the satisfaction of the court. In such a situation the person who is the recipient of the document, be it either a letter or a telegram, would be in a reasonably good position both with reference to his prior knowledge of the writing or the signature of the alleged sender limited though it may be, as also his knowledge of the subject matter of the chain of correspondence, to speak to its authorship. In an appropriate case the court may also be in a position to judge whether the document constitutes a genuine link in the chain of correspondence and thus to determine its authorship. We are unable, therefore, to say that the approach adopted by the courts below in arriving at the conclusion that the letters are genuine is open to any serious legal objection. The question, if any, can only be as to the adequacy of the material on which the conclusion as to the genuineness of the letters is arrived at. That however is a matter which we cannot permit to be canvassed before us.- It is thus clear that uncorroborated evidence of a hand writing expert is an extremely weak type of evidence and the same should not be relied upon either for the conviction or for acquittal. ; adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn only if it withholds certain evidence and not merely on account of its failure to obtain certain evidence.; It is not necessary that all those persons who were present at the spot must be examined by the prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused. Having examined all the witnesses, even if other persons present nearby not examined, the evidence of eye-witness cannot be discarded.; mitigating factors which are – old age of the appellant-accused, health ailments, responsibility of looking after the unmarried daughter suffering from congenital heart disease, past meritorious service and prolonged trial. Keeping in view the aforementioned factors especially the old age and physical condition of the appellant-accused, we do not think it expedient to put him back in jail. While we uphold the findings as to the guilt of the appellant-accused, we are of the opinion that the cause of justice would be best sub-served when the sentence of the appellant-accused would be altered to the period already undergone. We, therefore, reduce the sentence of the appellant to the period already undergone by him as a special case considering his very advanced age.

Regarding sale of the suit property by Defendants 7 and 8 to Defendant 9, it was held that Defendant 9 admittedly bought the property with the full knowledge of the litigations, and hence, Defendant 9 was not entitled to any equities. ; a purchaser of a coparcener’s undivided interest in the joint family property is not entitled to possession of what he had purchased. He has a right only to sue for partition of the property and ask for allotment of his share in the suit property.;Suffice it to say, Article 2177 does not prohibit alienation of undivided interest, which is in tune with the principle underlying Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.-“It is not lawful to a co-owner, however, to dispose a specific part of the thing held indivisibly, without the same being allotted to him in partition; and a transfer of the right, which he has to the share belonging to him, may be restricted in accordance with the law.”=In our view, no substantial or grave injustice is caused to the Defendants: on the contrary, the justice of the case, on facts, is in favour of the Plaintiff, and therefore, no interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is required. Once, it is found that justice of the case on facts does not require interference, this Court, even at the appellate stage, is well within its discretion to stay its hands off, as held in Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad[6].

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2910 OF 2013 SYSCON CONSULTANTS P. LTD. … Continue reading Regarding sale of the suit property by Defendants 7 and 8 to Defendant 9, it was held that Defendant 9 admittedly bought the property with the full knowledge of the litigations, and hence, Defendant 9 was not entitled to any equities. ; a purchaser of a coparcener’s undivided interest in the joint family property is not entitled to possession of what he had purchased. He has a right only to sue for partition of the property and ask for allotment of his share in the suit property.;Suffice it to say, Article 2177 does not prohibit alienation of undivided interest, which is in tune with the principle underlying Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.-“It is not lawful to a co-owner, however, to dispose a specific part of the thing held indivisibly, without the same being allotted to him in partition; and a transfer of the right, which he has to the share belonging to him, may be restricted in accordance with the law.”=In our view, no substantial or grave injustice is caused to the Defendants: on the contrary, the justice of the case, on facts, is in favour of the Plaintiff, and therefore, no interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is required. Once, it is found that justice of the case on facts does not require interference, this Court, even at the appellate stage, is well within its discretion to stay its hands off, as held in Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad[6].