whether the Division Bench was right in dismissing the appeals “as not pressed”. = In our opinion, neither there was any express prayer made by the MUDA and nor it could be inferred from the document relied on by the Division Bench at the instance of respondents (writ petitioners) for forming an opinion “not to press the appeal”. In other words, the opinion formed by the High Court for dismissing the appeals “as not pressed” had no basis. Such dismissal, in our view, certainly deprived the MUDA of their right to prosecute the appeals on merits.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9182­9188 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) … Continue reading whether the Division Bench was right in dismissing the appeals “as not pressed”. = In our opinion, neither there was any express prayer made by the MUDA and nor it could be inferred from the document relied on by the Division Bench at the instance of respondents (writ petitioners) for forming an opinion “not to press the appeal”. In other words, the opinion formed by the High Court for dismissing the appeals “as not pressed” had no basis. Such dismissal, in our view, certainly deprived the MUDA of their right to prosecute the appeals on merits.

whether the petitioners are entitled to complete the term of five years taking advantage of the amended provision which gives such Presiding Officers to continue until attaining the age of 65 years or to continue till they reach the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. This view of ours would negate the contention of the learned ASG that Section 6 as amended does not create any right. If such an interpretation is accepted, then even those persons appointed as Presiding Officers after September 01, 2016, can be denied the right to continue in service till 65 years. Judgment in GlaxoSmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd., which was relied upon by the learned ASG would have no application. That was a case where there was an amendment to Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was brought into force on August 21, 1994 and the Court held the same to be prospective in nature. It was further held that the provision which was applicable as on the date of termination of the appellant in that case would apply. Obviously, such a case has no application to the instant case.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 732 OF 2018 GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU … Continue reading whether the petitioners are entitled to complete the term of five years taking advantage of the amended provision which gives such Presiding Officers to continue until attaining the age of 65 years or to continue till they reach the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. This view of ours would negate the contention of the learned ASG that Section 6 as amended does not create any right. If such an interpretation is accepted, then even those persons appointed as Presiding Officers after September 01, 2016, can be denied the right to continue in service till 65 years. Judgment in GlaxoSmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd., which was relied upon by the learned ASG would have no application. That was a case where there was an amendment to Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was brought into force on August 21, 1994 and the Court held the same to be prospective in nature. It was further held that the provision which was applicable as on the date of termination of the appellant in that case would apply. Obviously, such a case has no application to the instant case.

framing of substantial questions on both the issues as provided under Section 100(4) and (5) of the Code.= whether two Courts below were right in their respective jurisdiction in holding that the plaintiffs were able to prove their title over the suit land on the basis of evidence (oral/documentary) adduced by them and, if so, whether such finding should be upheld or not.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.5057 OF 2009 Narayana Gramani & Ors. ….Appellant(s) … Continue reading framing of substantial questions on both the issues as provided under Section 100(4) and (5) of the Code.= whether two Courts below were right in their respective jurisdiction in holding that the plaintiffs were able to prove their title over the suit land on the basis of evidence (oral/documentary) adduced by them and, if so, whether such finding should be upheld or not.

whether, in the State of Haryana, land notified under the provisions of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 (for short the PLP Act) is forest land or is required to be treated as forest land. If so, whether construction carried out by the applicant R. Kant & Co. on this land is in contravention of the notification dated 18th August, 1992 issued under the provisions of the PLP Act, the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and decisions of this Court. = Our answer to both the questions is in the affirmative.

IAs. 2310/2008 etc. in W.P. (C) NO. 4677 of 1985 etc. Page 1 of 81 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT … Continue reading whether, in the State of Haryana, land notified under the provisions of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 (for short the PLP Act) is forest land or is required to be treated as forest land. If so, whether construction carried out by the applicant R. Kant & Co. on this land is in contravention of the notification dated 18th August, 1992 issued under the provisions of the PLP Act, the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and decisions of this Court. = Our answer to both the questions is in the affirmative.

In view of the aforesaid findings, it is declared that insofar as Section 377 criminalises 51 consensual sexual acts of adults (i.e. persons above the age of 18 years who are competent to consent) in private, is violative of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. It is, however, clarified that such consent must be free consent, which is completely voluntary in nature, and devoid of any duress or coercion. ii. The declaration of the aforesaid reading down of Section 377 shall not, however, lead to the reopening of any concluded prosecutions, but can certainly be relied upon in all pending matters whether they are at the trial, appellate, or revisional stages. iii. The provisions of Section 377 will continue to govern non-consensual sexual acts against adults, all acts of carnal intercouse against minors, and acts of beastiality. iv. The judgment in Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr. v. Naz Foundation & Ors.57 is hereby overruled for the reasons stated in paragraph 19.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 76 OF 2016 NAVTEJ SINGH … Continue reading In view of the aforesaid findings, it is declared that insofar as Section 377 criminalises 51 consensual sexual acts of adults (i.e. persons above the age of 18 years who are competent to consent) in private, is violative of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. It is, however, clarified that such consent must be free consent, which is completely voluntary in nature, and devoid of any duress or coercion. ii. The declaration of the aforesaid reading down of Section 377 shall not, however, lead to the reopening of any concluded prosecutions, but can certainly be relied upon in all pending matters whether they are at the trial, appellate, or revisional stages. iii. The provisions of Section 377 will continue to govern non-consensual sexual acts against adults, all acts of carnal intercouse against minors, and acts of beastiality. iv. The judgment in Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr. v. Naz Foundation & Ors.57 is hereby overruled for the reasons stated in paragraph 19.

The scope of interference by the courts in regard to members of the armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. The courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 918 OF 2017 Maj. Amod … Continue reading The scope of interference by the courts in regard to members of the armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. The courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made